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CURRENT LEGISLATION
STATE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LEGISLATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The term "air pollution" encompasses any substance which by
its presence in the atmosphere impairs the public health and welfare,
the use and enjoyment of land, or the economy. It has been estimated
that over 1.6 million patients are treated annually for conditions re-
sulting from excess air pollution.' The most dramatic evidence of the
effects of air pollution on public health has resulted from studies of
extreme air pollution conditions during short periods of time." In Don-
ora, Pennsylvania, where the normal death rate was one death every
three days, 17 people died on one day during a severe smog,'
and in a London smog of 1952, 4000 more deaths than normal oc-
curred during a four-day period.' As dramatic as these air pollution
incidents are, the Surgeon General of the United States has stated that
the subtler, long-range effects of air pollution produce much more
serious health consequences.'
In addition to damaging the health of human beings, plants and
animals, air pollution causes extensive property damage,° including
disfigurement and soiling of buildings and cars. Air pollution can also
be quite annoying since it is likely to impair visibility and produce of-
fensive odors.
Regulation of air pollution, for the most part, has been aimed at
all its injurious effects. As a result, the legal definitions of air pollution
encompass all that is included within the common parlance definition.
In most control legislation, air pollution is defined as
the presence in the outdoor atmosphere of one or more air
pollutants or any combination thereof in such quantities and
of such characteristics and duration as to be, or be likely to
be, injurious to public welfare, to the health of human, plant
1
 New Medical Materia, Feb. 1963, at 30.
2
 The most famous of the air pollution "episodes" occurred in the industrialized
Meuse Valley of Belgium in 1930, in Donors, Pennsylvania in 1948, in New York City in
1953, and in London, England in 1952 and 1962. Hearings on S. 780 Before the Subcomm.
on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sees.,
pt. 3, at 1120 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings].
3 Id.
4 Id.
"[Mir pollution is a health hazard [not] only when unusually severe weather
conditions conspire to produce localized disasters." Id. (statement by William H. Stewart,
Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service). The Surgeon General also
warned that the long range effects of air pollution should not be obscured by the occa-
sional major tragedy.
6
 U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, The Federal Air Pollution Program
18-19 (1966).
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or animal life, or to property, or as unreasonably to inter-
fere with the enjoyment of life and property.?
Air contaminants include dust, fumes, gas, mist, smoke, vapor, odors,
particulate matter or any combination of the above in the atmosphere.'
The legal definitions differ from the common parlance definition in
only one aspect: Air contamination existing within commercial and
7 This is the wording of the Connecticut statute. P.A. 754, § 1, 1967 Conn. Laws
(Conn. Leg. Serv. 1079-80 (1967)). A number of states have substantially similar
language. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-1933(2) (Supp. 1967); ch. 67-436, § 4(3), 1967 Fla.
Laws (Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 932 (1967)) (definition covers both air and water pollution);
S. Bill 428, § 2(b), 1967 Kan. Laws; Ky. Rev. Stat, Ann. § 224.310(6) (Supp. 1967) ;
Miss. Code Ann. § 7106-112(2) (b) (Supp. 1966); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 69-3906(2)
(Supp. 1967); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2C-2 (Supp. 1967); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-14-2(B)
(Supp. 1967) ; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4477-5, §§ 2(C), (D) (Supp. 1967) ; ch.
61, § 1(2), 1967 Wash. Laws (Wash. Leg, Serv. 568 (1967)) ; ch. 83, § 6-144.30, 1967
Wis. Laws.
A number of statutes require actual injurious effect rather than only a likelihood of
injurious effect. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 66-29-3 (Supp. 1967); Del. Code Ann. tit.
7, § 6202(a) (Supp. 1966); Ga. Code Ann. § 88-902(b) (Supp. 1967) ; Hawaii Rev.
Laws § 47-61 (Supp. 1965) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 111%, § 240.2(c) (Smith-Hurd 1966) ;
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 35-4602(c) (Supp. 1967); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 461(2)
(Supp. 1967) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 14-58(2) (c) (Supp. 1965); N.Y. Pub. Health Law
§ 1267(4) (McKinney Supp. 1967); H. Bill 689, § 1-3704.01(B), 1967 Ohio Laws; ch.
80, § 2(B) (g), 1967 Okla. Laws (Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 114-15 (1967)); Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 449.760(3) (1965); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 4003(5) (1964); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 53-3409(c) (Supp. 1967); Utah Code Ann. § 26-24-2(3) (Supp. 1967); Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 35-489(b) (Supp. 1967).
The Maryland control statute requires that injury can be predicted with reasonable
certainty. Md. Ann. Code art. 43, § 691(a) (Supp. 1967).
The Missouri statute requires that the air contaminants "directly and proximately
cause or contribute to injury." Mo. Ann. Stat. § 203.020(4) (Supp. 1967).
Iowa requires that the air contaminants be injurious to "normal human, plant, or
animal life .. • ." H. File 480, § 2(3), 1967 Iowa Acts (Iowa Leg. Serv. 277 (1967)).
Three states, Idaho, Virginia and West Virginia, limit air pollution to air con-
taminants put in the air by man. Idaho Code Ann. § 39-2902 (Supp. 1967); Va. Code
Ann. § 10-17.10(b) (Supp. 1966) ; W. Va. Code Ann. § 16-20-2 (Supp. 1967).
Two states, New Hampshire and Rhode Island, include within air pollution air con-
taminants that create disagreeable or unnatural odors or obscure visibility. H. Bill 352,
§ 1-125:79(I), 1967 N.H. Laws; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 23-25-3 (Supp. 1966).
Arizona and North Carolina do not include air contaminants that interfere only with
enjoyment of life and property. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1701(1) (Supp. May 1967);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-213(5) (Supp. 1967).
Louisiana and South Carolina do not have definitions of air pollution, but do have
definitions of "undesirable levels" of air contaminants. The Louisiana definition of
"undesirable levels" is very similar to those definitions of air pollution that require actual
injurious effect. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:2202(c) (1965). The South Carolina definition
of "undesirable levels" is similar to Louisiana's but excludes interference with enjoyment
of life and property. S.C. Code Ann. § 70-101(17) (Supp. 1965).
A few states have statutes on air pollution without defining the term "air pollution."
See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 111, § 31C (Supp. 1966); Cal. Health & Safety Code
§§ 24198-341 (West 1967). The United States statutes that have dealt with air pollution
have not defined the term. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857a-1857I (1964), as amended, (Supp. I
1965), as amended, (Supp. Feb. 1968).
8 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, § 6202(b) (Supp. 1966); ch. 727, § 2(A), 1967 Tex.
Laws (Vernon's Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1942 (1967)).
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industrial plants is excluded from the legal definitions, since work-
men's compensation and labor laws provide rights and remedies suf-
ficient to control this indoor air pollution. 9
The sources of air pollution are numerous and varied," but some
broad categories can be delineated: (1) industrial and commercial
sources—this group includes such major concerns as oil refineries,
power plants, steel mills and chemical plants as well as such com-
mercial sources as dry-cleaning establishments and restaurants; (2)
municipal sources—this category includes municipally owned power
plants, garbage dumps and municipally sponsored demolition and
construction operations; (3) transportational sources—automobiles,
trucks, airplanes and ocean-going vessels are included within this
group; (4) agricultural and natural sources—this category includes
crop spraying (agricultural) and forest fires (natural); and (5) indi-
vidual sources—in this category fall private home and apartment house
heating plants and incinerators.
Technological progress, industrial expansion, urbanization and
the increased use of motor vehicles have brought about a tremendous
increase in the amount of pollution in the air. Although the effect of
air pollution on the cleanliness of communities, on visibility, and on
the health and comfort of the people has been recognized in the past,
it has been tolerated, for the most part, as the necessary result of the
increased industrialization and population density in the cities. Re-
cently, however, contamination of the atmosphere has increased to
such a level that the assumption that air pollution must accompany the
present level of urbanization and industrialization has been questioned.
Methods of control are being sought for all of the types of air pollu-
tion sources. Where methods of control are not being found, the eco-
nomic and social value of particular air pollution sources is being
reevaluated.
In response to public pressure, most state and local governments
have been adopting air pollution control legislation. Nearly every state
in the United States has considered air pollution control legislation
over the last couple of years or is considering it now,' and Congress
9 See, e.g., N,Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 3(2) (McKinney 1965). See generally
58 Am. Jur. Workmen's Compensation § 252 (1948).
10 See U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Technological Change as It
Relates to Air Pollution, in 5 Technology and the American Economy V-135 (1966).
11 Forty-four states have legislation aimed specifically at air pollution control.
Alaska Stat. §§ 18.30.010-.020 (1962) (nuisance provision aimed at air pollution, enacted
in 1949; Alaska also has an administrative code enacted pursuant to its public health
law. See U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, & Welfare, Digest of State Air Pollution Laws
2-4 (1966)) ; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 36-1701 to -1719 (Supp. May 1967) (enacted in
1967) ; Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 82-1931 to -1943 (Supp. 1967) (enacted in 1965) ; Cal. Health
& Safety Code §§ 24198-341 (West 1967) (Air Pollution Control District Act, enacted
in 1947 and amended periodically); ch. 1545, 1967 Cal. Laws (Cal. Leg. Serv. 2765-88
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(1967)) (Mulford-Carrell Air Resources Act, enacted in 1967); Cal. Health & Safety
Code §§ 24345-74 (West 1967) (Bay Area Control Act, enacted in 1955 and amended
periodically; the Los Angeles County Air Pollution District has also promulgated regu-
lations for control in Los Angeles. See 1967 Hearings 1174); Colo, Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 66-29-1 to -16 (Supp. 1967) (enacted in 1966) ; P.A. 754, 1967 Conn. Laws (Conn.
Leg. Serv. 1079-84 (1967)); Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, §§ 6001-33 (Supp. 1966) (en-
acted in 1966); ch. 67-436, 1967 Fla. Laws (Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 931-41 (1967)),
repealing Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 403.01-.21 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1966) (the original
act was enacted in 1957 and amended periodically thereafter; the comprehensive revision
and repealer of the original act was enacted in 1967) ; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 88-901 to -916
(Supp. 1967) (enacted in 1967) ; Hawaii Rev. Laws §§ 47-60 to -79 (Supp. 1965) (en-
acted in 1957 and amended in 1965); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 39-2901 to -2923 (Supp. 1967),
repealing §§ 39-2901 to -2923 (1961) (original statute enacted in 1959; new statute
enacted in 1967) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 111'4, §§ 240.1-.17 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (enacted in
1963 and amended periodically thereafter) ; Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 35-4601 to -4608 (Supp.
1967) (enacted in 1961); H. File 480, 1967 Iowa Acts (Iowa Leg. Serv. 276-85 (1967))
(enacted in 1967) ; S. Bill 428, 1967 Kan. Laws (enacted in 1967); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 77.005-.990 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1967) (Air Pollution Control District Act,
enacted in 1952 and amended in 1966) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 224.310-.991 (Supp.
1967) (state-wide control act, enacted in 1966); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 55 40:2201-16 (1965),
as amended, (Supp. 1967) (enacted in 1964 and amended in 1967) ; Md. Ann. Code art.
43, §§ .690-704 (Supp. 1967), repealing Md. Ann. Code art. 43, .55 690-706 (1965)
(original statute enacted in 1963 and amended in 1964 and 1966; new statute enacted in
1967); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 111, § 31C (1958), as amended, (Supp. 1966) (enacted
in 1954 and amended in 1963); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 111, §§ 142A-142C (Supp.
1966), formerly Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 111, § 142A (1958) (original statute enacted
in 1954; new statute enacted in 1959 and amended thereafter) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§
14.58(1)-(26) (Supp. 1965), as amended, P.A. 95, 1966 Mich. Laws (Mich. Stat. Ann.,
Current Material 172-73 (1966)) (enacted in 1965 and amended in 1966); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 144.12(14) (Supp. 1967) (enacted in 1957); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 7106-111 to -136
(Supp. 1966) (enacted in 1966) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 203.010-.180 (Supp. 1967) (enacted
in 1965) ; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 69-3904 to -3923 (Supp. 1967) (enacted in 1967) ;
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 445.400-.595 (1967); H. Bill 352, 1967 N.H. Laws (enacted in 1967);
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 26:2C-1 to -23 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1967) (enacted in 1954
and amended periodically thereafter); ch. 108, 1967 N.J. Laws (N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 372
(1967)) (emergency control act added in 1967) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. 55 12-14-1 to -13
(Supp. 1967) (enacted in 1967); N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 1264-98 (McKinney Supp.
1967) (enacted in 1957 and amended periodically thereafter) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 143-211
to -215.10 (Supp. 1967) (air and water pollution control statute enacted in 1967) ; H.
Bill 689, 1967 Ohio Laws (enacted in 1967) ; ch. 80, 1967 Okla. Laws (Okla. Sess. Law
Serv. 114-20 (1967)) (enacted in 1967); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 449.015-.070, 449.760-.990
(1965) (enacted in 1959 and amended in 1961) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §§ 4001-15
(1964), as amended, (Supp. 1967) (enacted in 1960 and amended in 1966) ; R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. §§ 23-25-1 to -22 (Supp. 1966), formerly R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 23-25-1
to -27 (1956) (enacted in 1966 to replace the 1902 smoke abatement act) ; S.C. Code
Ann. §§ 70-101 to -139 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1967) (enacted in 1952 as a water
pollution control act and amended in 1965 to include air pollution); Tenn. Code Ann.
§§ 53-3408 to -3422 (Supp. 1967), repealing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 53-3401 to -3407 (1966)
(original statute enacted in 1959, present statute enacted in 1967); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 4477-5 (Supp. 1967), repealing Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4477-4 (1966)
(original statute enacted in 1965, new statute enacted in 1967) ; Utah Code Ann.
§5 26-24-1 to -18 (Supp. 1967) (enacted in 1967) ; Va. Code Ann. §§ 10-17.10 to -17.30
(Supp. 1966) (enacted in 1966) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §5 70.94.010-.900 (1962), as
amended, (Supp. 1967), as amended, ch. 238, 1967 Wash. Laws (Wash. Leg. Serv. 568-91
(1967)) (enacted in 1957 and amended periodically thereafter); W. Va. Code Ann.
§§ 16-20-1 to -13 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1967) (enacted in 1961 and amended in
1963 and 1967); ch. 83, 1967 Wis. Laws (enacted in 1967); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-487
to -502 (Supp. 1967) (enacted in 1967).
715
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
has passed the Air Quality Act of 1967 12
 to aid the states in their con-
trol programs.
The judicial and legislative responses to the air pollution problem
have been varied. In some cases, when individuals have brought ac-
tions alleging damage from air pollution, courts have applied nuisance
and trespass theories to grant relief. Municipal and state legislative
bodies have enacted ordinances and statutes to provide public reme-
dies against air pollution. Intermunicipal and interstate control agen-
cies have been set up where, because of the scope and location of the
air pollution, existing political subdivisions cannot provide adequate
control. A number of federal statutes, including one in 1967, have been
enacted to fund local control programs and to control interstate air
pollution where the states affected are unable to provide this control.
Because of the scope and complexities of the legal responses to
the air pollution problem, this comment will not attempt a complete ex-
position of the law in the area. Instead this comment will attempt to
familiarize the reader with those aspects of air pollution control that
will be of value in assessing the fairness and effectiveness of existing
legal responses. To this end the comment will first survey the various
means of control that now exist: common law nuisance and trespass
theories, statutory nuisance, municipal air pollution codes, intermunici-
pal control acts, state control legislation, interstate air pollution com-
pacts, and federal Clean Air legislation. Following this, the comment
will analyze the state air pollution legislation since most of the present
day air pollution control is being performed at the state level. The first
step in this analysis will be to examine the constitutional boundaries
upon the enforcement of the prohibitions of these statutes in order to
determine how much these boundaries impair the effectiveness of state
air pollution control. Second, the statutes will be examined to deter-
mine the point at which they strike a balance between the public and
private benefits from air pollution sources and the detrimental effects
of air pollution. From this, overall conclusions will be formed about
the fairness and effectiveness of the state control legislation.
II. THE EXISTING LAW OF AIR POLLUTION
A. Common Law
1. Private Nuisance Action.—The unreasonable use of one's property
so as to cause substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of an-
other's land is a common law nuisance actionable by the person who
In the District of Columbia, the Department of Public Health has been given the
responsibility of creating a control program. There have been efforts in North Dakota
to obtain a control statute. See 1967 Hearings 1183, 1226, 1242.
12 81 Stat. 485, 42 IJS.C. §§ 1857-18571 (Supp. Feb. 1968) .
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is deprived of the beneficial use of his land." The plaintiff's remedy
is ordinarily restricted to money damages, but if the plaintiff can show
that this legal remedy is inadequate a court will enjoin the defendant
from continuation of his conduct."
In order to recover in nuisance against one who is emitting air
contaminants, the plaintiff must show: (1) a substantial interference'
with the use and enjoyment of his land, (2) that the defendant's con-
duct was either (a) intentional" and unreasonable or (b) uninten-
tional and actionable under the rules governing liability for negligent,
reckless or ultrahazardous conduct," and (3) that the defendant's
conduct was the proximate cause of the interference. If intent is found,
the unreasonableness of the invasion is determined by a balancing
process in which the gravity of harm done to the plaintiff is weighed
against the social utility of the defendant's business and the suitability
of the defendant's business to its location.' If the defendant's conduct
is unintentional, the plaintiff must show that the possibility of injury
created an unreasonable risk of harm.
Although nuisance theory has been used for recovery of per-
sonal injury or property damages caused by air pollution," the ob-
stacles to the plaintiff's case are formidable. Since multiple sources of
emissions often contribute to the air pollution in a given locality, it
is often impossible for the plaintiff to show which among several air
pollution sources in an urban area is the proximate cause of his harm.
Although all of the sources might be joined, the majority of courts re-
quire the plaintiff to show that the injury was traceable directly to each
defendant." Depending upon the type of injury that is being claimed,
the plaintiff will not always be able to show the requisite substantial
interference. Certainly, if all the plaintiff can show is that the pollu-
tion is annoying, he will not prevail.' Moreover, if he tries to recover
13 Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Marable, 65 Ga. App. 877, 16 S.E.2d 771 (1941). See gen-
erally 39 Am. Jur. Nuisances § 2 (1942).
14 See Griffith v. Newman, 217 Ga. 533, 123 S.E.2d 723 (1962) ; Pendoley v.
Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 142 (1963).
15 W. Prosser, Torts § 88, at 598 (3d ed. 1964).
16 Defendant's conduct is "intentional" when he is substantially certain that he
will interfere with another's use and enjoyment of land. Restatement of Torts § 825
(1939).
17 See Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948) ; Hagy v. Allied
Chem. & Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 265 P.2d 86 (1953).
18 Patterson v. Peabody Coal Co., 3 III. App. 2d 311, 122 N.E.2d 48 (1954) ; Re-
statement of Torts §§ 826-28 (1939).
19 See Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Marable, 65 Ga. App. 877, 16 S.E.2d 771 (1942). See
generally Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 764 (1957).
20 See O'Neal v. Southern Carbon Co., 216 La. 95, 43 So. 2d 230 (1949) ; Maas v.
Perkins, 42 Wash. 2d 38, 253 P.2d 427 (1953). But cf. British-American Oil Producing
Co. v. McClain, 191 Okla. 40, 41, 126 P.2d 530, 531 (1942).
21 See Thiel v. Cernin, 224 Ark. 857, 858, 276 S.W.2d 677, 679 (1955) ; Reynolds
v. Community Fuel Co., 309 Ky. 716, 720, 218 S.W.2d 950, 952-53 (1949).
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for the types of injuries to health that would be considered substantial,
he faces the burden of proving a cause and effect relationship. Since
the types of injuries that air pollution causes might be brought about
by conditions other than air pollution, the burden is often insurmount-
able."
Finally, the burden placed on the plaintiff to prove that the de-
fendant was negligent or that his conduct was intentional and unrea-
sonable is often very great.' The reasonableness of the defendant's
conduct is determined by weighing the social utility of the defendant's
activity and the suitability of this activity to its location against the
gravity of harm to the plaintiff. Since the major producers of air pollu-
tion are large industrial and commercial concerns which have a con-
siderable amount of economic and social value and are most often lo-
cated in suitable places, the injury to the plaintiff will have to be very
great before a nuisance suit will be successful. 24
Even if nuisance actions could successfully be maintained, they
would not be effective vehicles for air pollution control. Since litigation
is expensive and many people would rather submit to the status quo
than litigate, few suits are likely to be brought. As a result, industries
which cause much of the pollution are not likely to curtail emissions
because of the threat of private nuisance actions. The cost of purchas-
ing air pollution control devices is often much greater than the cost of
paying out claims to those few plaintiffs who file and successfully main-
tain private nuisance suits.'
2. Trespass.—Under the Restatement of Torts definition," a person
is liable in trespass if he intentionally causes an unprivileged entry of
a person or object on land possessed by another. To establish trespass,
one need only show an intentional, unprivileged entry onto the land,
whereas to prove nuisance, a substantial and unreasonable interfer-
ence with the use and enjoyment of land must be shown. In most cases,
the proof necessary for trespass is easier because the burden of show-
ing that the defendant's conduct is unreasonable is absent. Also, no
22 See Council of State Governments, State Air Pollution Control Act, in 26 Sug-
gested State Legislation A-3 (1967) ; Griswold, Response: The Reasonable Approach to
Air Pollution Control, in National Conference on Air Pollution Proceedings 13 (U.S.
Dept of Health, Education, and Welfare (1963)) ; 1967 Hearings 1119 (statement of
William Stewart, Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service) ; Rhein-
gold, Civil Cause of Action for Lung Damage Due to Pollution of Urban Atmosphere, 33
Brooklyn L. Rev. 17, 30 (1966).
23 See Patterson v. Peabody Coal Co., 3 Ill. App. 2d 311, 122 N.E.2d 48 (1954).
24 See Fuchs v. Curran Carbonizing & Eng'r Co., 279 S.W.2d 211, 218 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1955), in which the court stated that persons who live in cities must submit
without recourse to annoyances and discomforts incident to municipal life because com-
mercial enterprises are necessary for the progress of the public at large.
25 See Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert, 324 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1963).
20 Restatement of Torts § 158 (1934).
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substantial injury need be shown in a trespass action—the mere entry
is sufficient."
One requirement has, however, made it difficult to recover in air
pollution cases under a trespass theory: There must be a physical entry
by a person or object. In defining "object" some courts have noted
that it must be sufficiently substantial to deprive the possessor of his
right to exclusive possession of his land. As a result, many courts have
held that the entry of fumes, smoke, dust, and gas onto the plaintiff's
land is not substantial enough to be a trespass." Other courts have ac-
complished the same end without depending on the insubstantiality of
the invasion by requiring that the invasion be direct. Since an inter-
vening force, such as wind, is usually necessary to carry air contami-
nants from their source, the entry is held not to be direct."
In Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.," the Supreme Court of Oregon
refused to accept distinctions based on the size of the interfering par-
ticle or the way it.was placed on the plaintiff's land. Instead, the court
emphasized the object's energy or force and held that the intrusion of
invisible fluoride particulates and gases onto the plaintiff's land con-
stituted a trespass. The court defined trespass as the invasion of a
landowner's right to exclusive possession whether by visible or invis-
ible substances 3 1. Recognizing sub silentio that this departure from
the traditional definition of trespass would impose a heavy burden on
industry, however, the court stated that a balancing-of-interests test,
similar to that involved in nuisance law, must be used to decide if the
defendant's intrusion violated a legally protected interest of the
plainti ff
In Martin, the artificial distinctions of the majority rule were
discarded so that the plaintiff had a remedy in trespass against air
pollution. Since the court held that it must balance the interests in the
same manner, however, whether the suit is brought in nuisance or
trespass, the only practical advantage in bringing a trespass action is
the longer statute of limitations."
Even under Martin, trespass theory is inadequate for the effective
control of air pollution. The difficulty in pinpointing which among
27 Longenecker v. Zimmerman, 175 Kan. 719, 267 P.2d 543 (1954) ; 1 F. Harper
& F. James, Torts § 1.8, at 26 (1956).
28 See Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 232 Iowa 600, 4 N.W.2d 435 (1942); Annot.,
54 A.L.R.2d 764, 778 (1957).
Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 125 F. Supp. 481, 488 (W.D. Wash. 1954).
30 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959).
31 Id. at 94, 342 P.2d at 794.
32 Id. at 96, 342 P.2d at 795.
33 Compare Ore. Rev. Stat. § 12.080 (1963) (trespass—six years) with Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 12.110 (1967) (nuisance—two years). Some states have the same statute of
limitations for both trespass and nuisance. See, e.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5526
(1958).
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many possible air pollution sources in an area is causing the plaintiff's
injury, the cost of litigation and the willingness of many people to
accept the status quo, all tend to discourage the filing of trespass suits
as they do nuisance suits.
3. Public Nuisance.---A nuisance is common or public when it affects
the rights of the public as a group; it is private when it affects one
individual or a determinable number of individuals in the enjoyment
of some private right not common to the public." Also possible is a
mixed nuisance where the right affected is public, yet the nuisance
causes special damage to an individual." The difference between pub-
lic and private nuisance is not in the nature or character of the activity
involved, but in the extent and scope of its injurious effect. Therefore,
the elements to be proved are the same whether the nuisance is public
or private," and the same balancing process to determine the reason-
ableness of the defendant's conduct is present in the public nuisance
suit." Unlike the private nuisance action, however, a public nuisance
suit is brought by the state or municipality, and either a criminal pen-
alty or an injunction is sought."
The common law public nuisance action offers more effective
control of air pollution than does the private nuisance or trespass ac-
tion. In the private nuisance suit, injunctions are given only where it
can be shown that the damage remedy is inadequate. In the public
nuisance suit, on the other hand, injunctions are likely to be given as
a matter of course. Also, since the state or municipality brings the suit,
some of the obstacles faced by private litigants may be eliminated or
reduced, e.g., the ability to pay the costs of litigation and the resigna-
tion of private individuals to the status quo. Despite these advantages,
however, public nuisance remains inadequate in controlling air pollu-
tion. It is often as difficult for the state to prove that the interference
is substantial and unreasonable as it is for the private litigant.39
24 See W. Prosser, Torts § 87, at 593-94 (3d ed. 1964).
35 Woods v. Rock Hill Fertilizer Co., 102 S.C. 442, 86 S.E. 817 (1915). See W.
Prosser, supra note 34, § 87, at 593-94.
36 See Kinney v. Koopman, 116 Ala. 310, 22 So. 593 (1897); Harris v. Poulton, 99
W. Va. 20, 28-29, 127 S.E. 647, 650-51 (1925).
37 See People v. Transit Dev. Co., 131 App. Div. 174, 115 N.Y.S. 297 (1909).
88 The adequacy of the criminal remedy is considered by the court in determining
whether to exercise its equity jurisdiction. See Engle v. Scott, 57 Ariz. 383, 114 P.2d 236
(1941); People ex rel. Barrett v. Fritz, 316 Ill. App. 217, 45 N.E.2d 48 (1942).
39 The general rule is that people who live in cities must submit to the discomforts
and annoyances of city life such as dust, smoke and odors. To constitute a nuisance, the
annoyance must be of a substantial character, and often it is difficult to ascertain whether
the effect of the defendant's emissions on the public will be considered substantial. Be-
cause the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct will be determined by weighing the
social utility of the activity and suitability of its location to the area against the gravity
of harm to the public, the state would have to prove that the emission of air con-
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B. Statutory Law
1. Statutory Nuisance.—A nuisance per se at common law was an act
or occupation, which, because of its inherent qualities, was a nuisance
at all times and under all circumstances, regardless of the location or
surroundings." Although the emission of smoke and other air con-
taminants was not considered a nuisance per se at common law," a
state" or municipality," by exercising its police power, may declare
the emission of certain quantities of air contaminants a nuisance per se.
Under such a statute, the state can establish a public nuisance merely
by showing that the defendant has committed the act which the statute
declares a nuisance.
Those states and municipalities which have not enacted compre-
hensive air pollution statutes or ordinances rely on public nuisance
provisions of existing health statutes" and ordinances' to control air
pollution. Statutory nuisance law is certainly more effective in control-
ling air pollution than common law nuisance or trespass. Declaring the
emission of a certain quantity of air contaminants a public nuisance
eliminates the requirement of proving actual injury or inconvenience
to the public. Also, the state no longer has to show that the defendant's
conduct was unreasonable. On the other hand, public nuisance law,
while effective in controlling air pollution, leaves no room for a judicial
balancing of the equities. In order to be fair to the defendant, a balance
must be struck so that the public will endure some inconvenience, and
the defendant will be able to use his property as long as the harm he
causes is not unreasonable. Although, presumably, there is some bal-
ancing of the interests when a regulation is promulgated by a state or
municipality, a new balance cannot be struck as times and conditions
change. In short, statutory nuisance law, in its rigidity, cannot under-
take the necessary balancing process by which the rights and privileges
of both the particular defendant and the public are adjusted to meet
the needs of society.
taminants by large industries which have much social and economic value and are
normally suitably located to the area, is producing grave harm to the public.
4° Kays v. City of Versailles, 224 Mo. App. 178, 180, 22 S.W.2d 182, 183 (1929) ;
Kinney v. Koopman, 116 Ala. 310, 318, 22 So. 593, 594 (1897).
41 Kennedy, The Legal Aspects of Air Pollution Control with Particular Reference
to the County of Los Angeles, 27 S. Cal. L. Rev. 373, 379 (1954).
42 See State v. Tower, 185 Mo. 79, 84 S.W. 10 (1904).
43 Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933) ; Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 355 Mich. 227, 93 N.W.2d 888 (1959), aff'd,
362 U.S. 440 (1960) ; Board of Health v. New York Central R.R., 4 N.J. 293, 72 A.2d
511 (1950).
44 See Ala. Code tit. 22, § 75 (1958) ; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2802 (1965), as
amended, (Supp. 1967) ; N.D. Cent. Code § 23-05-04 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1967) ;
S.D. Code §§ 58.0201(9) (d), (i) (Supp. 1960); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 610 (1959).
45 See ordinances collected in U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Digest
of Municipal Air Pollution Ordinances (1962).
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2. Municipal Air Pollution Codes.—The size of the municipality and
the extent of air pollution existing within it normally control the type
of air pollution program which is enacted." A city with an inconse-
quential amount of air pollution may not enact an air pollution code,
but instead may rely on a general nuisance ordinance. Cities such as
ChiCago and New York, however, have enacted comprehensive air
pollution codes under which an administrative agency is created and
given the power to promulgate and enforce restrictions upon the out-
put of various air contaminants 47
Air pollution is, for the most part a local problem; the amount of
air pollution in a city is affected by that city's industrialization, popu-
lation, topography, climate, and prevailing wind directions and veloc-
ities. Because the amount of air pollution can vary so greatly from
city to city within a state, municipal programs play a very important
role in controlling air pollution.
There are two major dangers in allowing municipal codes to be
the sole control of air pollution. First, the cities often lack the financial
resources necessary to purchase air pollution measurement and detec-
tion devices and to hire air pollution inspectors." Without these re-
sources a city's control program is likely to be inadequate since the
administrative agency cannot determine if its rules and regulations are
being observed. Second, although air pollution may be primarily a local
problem, it is not confined by political boundaries." The emission of
certain contaminants into the air from a source within one municipality
may have adverse effects on another municipality; yet, only the first
municipality can control the air pollution source.
3. Intermunicipal Control.—A regional or area-wide approach to air
pollution control has become prevalent in recent years because of the
limitations of municipal control.' In addition, the federal government
has provided incentive for the regional approach by granting more
funds to area-wide programs than to municipal programs.". Under an
area-wide approach, many political subdivisions may participate in one
control program. Of the approximately 70 area-wide air pollution pro-
grams now existing, there are two basic types of arrangements:
{1) those connected with studies, information, and advice, and
46 See 1967 Hearings 1371.
47 The comprehensive program may also include measuring pollutants, investigating
the adverse effects of air pollution, conducting public information campaigns, issuing
permits for installation and operation of potential air pollution sources, operating a
laboratory and examining and evaluating control devices. See id. 1370-71.
48 See id. 1363.
49 See note 174 infra.
" See 1967 Hearings 1364-67.
51 42 U.S.C. 1857(c) (a) (1) (Supp. Feb. 1968).
722
AIR POLLUTION LEGISLATION
(2) those concerned with enforcement." California," Kentucky,"
Maryland" and Washington" have used the second type of arrange-
ment and created air pollution control regions in which control agen-
cies have extensive rulemaking and enforcement authority. The largest
and most important example of such area-wide control is the Los
Angeles County District, which has jurisdiction over 4083 square miles
and 71 cities within the county."
4. State Control.—In recent years the trend has been to state-wide
air pollution control, partially because of the limitations of localized
control programs and partially because of the availability of federal
funds under the Clean Air Act of 1963." Nearly every state has con-
sidered control legislation in the past couple of years or is considering
it now." As a result, over 40 states now have air pollution control
legislation."
The statutes establish air pollution control commissions or boards
which are given the power to adopt, after a public hearing, reasonable
rules and regulations for the control of air pollution throughout the
state." The air pollution agency is also given the power to enforce
these rules and regulations, and in doing so is often instructed to con-
sider the reasonableness of the defendant's emissions." Reasonable-
ness is determined in each individual case by weighing a number of
factors, the most common of which are: (I) the type of injury or inter-
ference with safety, health or use of property which is caused or threat-
ened; (2) the social and economic value of the activity involved;
(3) the suitability of the activity to its location; and (4) the scientific
and economic practicability of reducing or eliminating the discharge
resulting from the activity. 63
Many of the states authorize the administrative agency to estab-
lish state-wide air pollution standards of two types:" air quality stand-
82 Id.
53 Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 24198-341 (West 1967).
64
 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 77.005-.990 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1967).
65 Md. Ann. Code art. 43, § 693 (Supp. 1967).
66 Ch. 238, 1967 Wash. Laws (Wash. Leg. Serv. 568-91 (1967)).
67 See 1967 Hearings 1368.
58 77 Stat. 392 (1963).
59 See note 11 supra.
CO See statutes cited note 11 supra. In 1967 alone the following states have enacted
air pollution statutes for the first time or have considerably revised older ones: Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Florida, .Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming.
61 See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 203.050(1) (1), .070 (Supp. 1967).
62 See, e.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4477-5, § 4(5) (b) (Supp. 1967).
63 See pp. 748-52 infra.
64 See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. §¢ 203.050(1) (1) (b) , .050(1) (2). See also 1967 Hearings
1380.
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ards, which refer to the quality of the air in the state as a whole, and
emission standards, which are the restrictions on specified emissions
from an air pollution source necessary to meet the air quality stand-
ards. The establishment of state-wide emission standards provides reg-
ulation of air pollution in a municipality where local government fails
to act. Most states recognize the need for more stringent emission
standards in some areas of the state than in others by allowing local
jurisdictions to promulgate stricter standards than those established
by the state air pollution control agency."
5. Interstate Compacts.--The realization that state control of air pol-
lution may be ineffective when the pollution is caused by a source in a
neighboring state has led to the enactment of interstate air pollution
compacts between Indiana and Illinois," and between New York, New
Jersey and Connecticut. 67 To facilitate the attack on interstate air pol-
lution, Congress, in the Clean Air Act of 1963, provided grants to inter-
state air pollution control agencies in amounts up to three-fourths of
the cost of developing and establishing regional air pollution control
programs, and up to three-fifths of the maintenance costs of such con-
trol programs."
6. Federal Legislation.—In 1955, Congress responded to the air
pollution crisis by authorizing a federal program of research and
technical assistance to state and local governments." In this initial
legislation, Congress established the policy that state and local govern-
ments should have primary responsibility in dealing with air pollution
problems, and that the federal government's obligation should be to
provide leadership and support. In 1959, Congress enacted legislation
directing every federal installation to cooperate with interstate, state,
or local air pollution control agencies." In 1960, it enacted the Schenk
Act which directed the Surgeon General of the United States to con-
duct a thorough study of air pollution caused by motor vehicles."'
Through the Clean Air Act of 1963, 72 the federal government
66 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, § 6207 (Supp. 1966). Some states specifically pre-
clude municipalities from enacting ordinances to control pollution. See, e.g., R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. § 23-25-19 (Supp. 1966).
66 See III. Ann. Stat. ch. 111%, § 240.31 (Smith-Hurd 1966) ; Ind. Ann. Stat.
§ 35-4621 (Supp. 1967).
67 See P.A. 554, 1967 Conn. Laws (Conn. Leg. Serv. 707-14 (1967)) ; N.J. Stat. Ann.
§§ 32:29-1 to -39 (Supp. 1967) ; N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 1299-m to -s (McKinney
Supp. 1967). There is a compact between Kansas and Missouri. Missouri has enacted the
compact, but, as of this writing, the Kansas version was unavailable. See Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 203.600 (Supp. 1967). There is also a compact between West Virginia and Ohio. See
Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3723.01-.03 (Supp. 1967) ; W. Va. Code §§ 29-16-1 to -5 (Supp. 1967).
es 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (c) (a) (1) (Supp. Feb. 1968).
69
 69 Stat. 322 (1955).
70 73 Stat. 646 (1959).
71 74 Stat. 162 (1960).
72 77 Stat. 392 (1963).
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broadened its role in air pollution control by requiring that: (1) the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare develop air quality
criteria" to guide control agencies in protecting the public health and
welfare; (2) federal financial assistance be given to interstate, state,
regional, and local agencies to help finance the establishment and
development of air pollution control programs; and (3) the Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare participate in controlling interstate
and, upon request of the state concerned, intrastate air pollution en-
dangering health and welfare. The Clean Air Act was amended in
1965" to enable the Secretary to establish national motor-vehicle
emission standards and again in 1966 75 to authorize increased federal
grants to air pollution control agencies.
The Air Quality Act of 1967" was enacted to supplement the
Clean Air Act of 1963. While the new legislation allocates larger sums
to the control of air pollution, it continues the federal policy that con-
trolling air pollution is primarily the responsibility of the state and
local governments. As a result, when the Johnson Administration pro-
posed that national emission standards be created on an industry-wide
basis, Congress refused to enact the standards since to do so would
shift the burden of control onto the federal government."
Some of the more important sections of the Air Quality Act pro-
vide: (1) more funds to expand research activities" and to grant
technical and financial assistance to state and local governments to
develop and maintain their air pollution control programs; 75 (2)
grants to state air pollution control agencies which develop uniform
state inspection and testing programs for air pollution control devices
on motor vehicles;' (3) strict controls on the introduction of fuel
additives into interstate commerce; 91 and (4) the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare, after consulting with state and local authori-
ties, with the duty of designating air quality control regions based on
jurisdictional boundaries, urban-industrial concentrations and other
factors." The states must then adopt air quality standards applicable
to air quality regions or portions thereof located within their bound-
73 Air quality criteria are not regulations or standards for the control of air pollu-
tion; they are merely an indication of the effect that can be expected from exposure to
various concentrations of a particular air contaminant or a combination of air con-
taminants. • U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, The Federal Air Pollution
Program 20 (1966).
74 79 Stat. 992 (1965).
75 80 Stat. 954 (1966).
78 81 Stat. 485, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1857/ (Supp. Feb. 1968).
77 Wall Street Journal, Nov. 22, 1967, at 8, col. 2.
78 42 U.S.C. §§ 18576, 1857b-1 (Supp. Feb. 1968).
73 Id. § 1857c.
80 Id. § 1857f-6b.
81 Id. § 1857f-6c.
82 Id. § 1857c-2.
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aries." If a state fails to take reasonable action to enforce such stand-
ards within 180 days after it is notified by the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare that they are being violated, the federal govern-
ment can bring suit to abate the pollution provided that the air pollu-
tion is interstate. If the air pollution is intrastate, however, the federal
government can step in only if requested to do so by the governor of
the state.
HI. STATE An2 POLLUTION CONTROL
A. Basic Structure of Regulation
The heart of any state control is in its basic prohibitions or emis-
sion standards. Around these emission standards, one of two basic
types of control systernS may be formed: the "prohibitory system" or
the "permit system." In the "prohibitory 'system" emission standards
or restrictions on the use of materials or processes" are created
either by the state legislature' or by an administrative agency" under
a grant of power from the legislature." In some situations the legisla-
ture may allow the municipalities to create additional or more re-
strictive standards." Enforcement of the standards is normally per-
formed by an administrative agency, although in some cases existing
criminal law enforcement methods may be used. The enforcement
agency may also have the power to issue variances, that is, statements
that they will not enforce the standard. Violation of a standard will
result in a penal sanction, either a fine or an injunction or both."
83 Id. § 1857d.
84 See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 24242 (West 1967) :
A person shall not discharge into the atmosphere from any single source of
emission whatsoever any air contaminant for a period or periods aggregating
more than three minutes in any one hour which is: (a) As dark or darker in
shade as that designated as No. 2 on the Ringelmann Chart, as published by
the United States Bureau of Mines, or (b) Of such opacity as to obscure an
observer's view to a degree equal to or greater than does smoke described in
subsection (a) of this section.
86 See id.; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 66-29-5(3) (Supp. 1967) which prohibits:
[Allowing] combustion gas from any fuel-burning equipment in excess of 0.85
pounds per 1000 pounds of such gas, adjusted to 12 per cent carbon dioxide,
or solid particulates in any other gas in excess of 0.85 pounds per 1000 pounds
of undiluted gas, to escape into the atmosphere or pass any convenient measur-
ing point in a discharge system.
86 "Administrative agency" is intended to include air pollution control boards, air
pollution control commissions, air pollution control authorities, departments of health,
and similar designations in the various state statutes.
87 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1707(A) (Supp. May 1967) ; Cal. Health &
Safety Code § 24260 (West 1967) ; N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 1271(1)(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1967).
88 See note 65 supra.
89 A determination that an individual has violated a restriction will generally result
726
AIR POLLUTION LEGISLATION
In the second method of controlling air pollution, the "permit
system,"" standards are created just as they are in the "prohibitory
system." In addition, an administrative agency is given the duty of
reviewing plans and specifications for proposed or already existing
sources of air contamination. The agency then endeavors to ascertain
whether the source will be able to comply with applicable standards. If
compliance with such standards .
 is deemed possible, then a permit is
issued enabling the applicant to build or operate.". The permit will
usually set forth the terms upon which its validity is conditioned,
often simply a restatement of the standard.' On the other hand, if
compliance with the standards is not deemed possible, then a permit
will not be issued and the proposed or existing air pollution source
will not be allowed to operate. Building or operating a potential air
pollution source without a required permit will generally result in a
penal sanction." A penal sanction will also be imposed upon an in-
dividual who violates the provisions of any permits which are granted."
This section of the comment will analyze the "prohibitory sys-
tem" and "permit system" to determine their fairness and effective-
ness as means of air pollution control. The initial discussion will center
around the due process clause of the federal constitution and the
limitation that this concept of fairness imposes upon the effectiveness
of the control systems. The discussion will then broaden to a treatment
of how state control legislation protects the various interests involved
in either a finding of a misdemeanor punishable by fine, see, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann.
§ 82-1909(a) (Supp. 1967), or the issuance of an injunction, see, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 36-1715 (Supp. May 1967). Thus, the ultimate penal sanction derives either from
the violation of the standard itself or from violation of an injunction issued pursuant to
violation of a standard. On the latter point, see H. McClintock, Principles of Equity
§ 17 (2d ed. 1948).
no Twenty-four states have enabling legislation for a permit system. See Ark..Stat.
Ann. § 82-1935(j) (Supp. 1967); Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 24263-82 (West 1967);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, § 6203(7) (Supp. 1966) ; ch. 67-436, § 7(16), 1967 Fla. Laws
(Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 935 (1967)) ; Hawaii Rev. Laws § 47-64(d) (Supp. 1965); Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. MIA, § 240.5-1.2 (Smith-Hurd 1966); H. File 480, § 5(7), 1967 Iowa
Acts (Iowa Leg. Serv. 280 (1967)); S. Bill 428, § 8, 1967 Kan. Laws; Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 224.360 (Supp. 1967) (Control Act) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 77.195 (1963)
(Control District Act) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 14.58(5) (h) (Supp. 1965) ; Miss. Code Ann.
§§ 7106-116(1), -118(a) (Supp. 1966) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 203.050(3) (b) (Supp. 1967);
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 69-3911 (Supp. 1967) ; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2C-9.2 (Supp.
1967) ; N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 1271(1)(b) (4) (McKinney Supp. 1967) ; N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 143-215.1(b) (Supp. 1967) ; H. Bill 689, § 1-3704.03(j), 1967 Ohio Laws; Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 449.795 (1965); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 23-25-5(k) (Supp. 1966) ; S.C. Code
Ann. § 70-108 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1965); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 53-3412(2)(c),
(4) (c) (Supp. 1967) ; Va. Code Ann. § 10-17.21 (Supp. 1966); ch. 238, §§ 29(1), 58,
1967 Wash. Laws (Wash. Leg. Serv. 578, 590 (1967)) ; ch. 83, § 6-144.39, 1967 Wis.
Laws.
" See, e.g., H. File 480, § 5(7), 1967 Iowa Acts (Iowa Leg. Serv. 280 (1967)).
02
 Cf. Madeiros v. Board of Aldermen, 350 Mass. 767, 213 N.E.2d 921 (1966)..
43
 See, e.g., Cal. Health Safety Code § 24279 (West 1967).
" See, e.g., id. § 24280.
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in air pollution control. For the major part of this analysis, primary
emphasis will be placed on the promulgation and enforcement of
standards to be used either in a "prohibitory" or "permit system."
Later, additional features of the "permit system" will be discussed and
related to conclusions drawn about the creation and enforcement of
standards.
B. Constitutional Limitations
An attribute of many air pollution control standards is their use
of words such as "reasonable," "disagreeable" and "obnoxious" in order
to obtain flexibility in their enforcement.' When the terms of a state
penal statute are so vague that men of ordinary intelligence must guess
at their meaning and differ as to their application, the requirements of
due process are not fulfilled. 96 Thus there is a substantial possibility of
conflict between air pollution control standards and due process of
law, since many standards employ such vague words and violation of a
standard results ultimately in a penal sanction.'
The terms used in penal statutes can be divided into two
categories: precise terms, which, on their face, can convey only one
reasonable meaning to the man of ordinary intelligence; and terms
which, on their face, are susceptible of more than one reasonable
meaning." Obviously, precise terms can never be held vague 99 because,
by definition, a man of ordinary intelligence would not have to guess
at their meaning.
Statutes which contain ambiguous terms may be struck down
because they deny due process of law. For two reasons, however, such
statutes will not always be voided. First, a court may supply a precise
external definition to an ambiguous term. Second, even if a precise
external definition has not been supplied, a court will balance the loss
to the individual resulting from upholding the statute against the
public injury if it is invalidated. If it finds that the public injury is
greater than the loss to the individual, it will uphold the statute.
Illustrative of providing a precise external definition is Bandini
Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court,lw where the Supreme Court of the
95 To the extent that permits issued in the "permit system" contain such terms as
conditions, the following discussion of the effect of due process requirements upon
standards in the "prohibitory system" will apply with equal force to such permits. How-
ever, where the standard contains such terms, but the permit issued pursuant to it does
not, then the permit will not be affected by due process requirements.
96 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
07 See note 89 supra.
98 This categorization is an adaptation of that used by Freund, The Use of In-
definite Terms in Statutes, 30 Yale L.J. 437 (1921).
99 Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev.
67, 90-91 (1960).
100 284 U.S. 8 (1931).
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United States considered a California statute prohibiting "the unrea-
sonable waste of natural gas" in oil operations. In such oil operations,
natural gas is often found under the ground, either above an oil forma-
tion or mixed in solution with the oil. The natural gas increases the
fluidity of the oil and makes it easier to lift. The California Supreme
Court had held that the term "unreasonable waste of natural gas"
meant allowing gas to come to the surface without using its lifting
power to bring the largest possible amount of oil to the surface."°'
Before supplying this definition, the court noted that it was entitled to
take judicial notice of matters of science and common knowledge,
including the condition and development of the petroleum industry."'
The court then concluded that when the statute is read with the added
definition, it is possible for a person to determine when he is comply-
ing.'" The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed, holding that
the statute was not unconstitutionally vague because it could be read
with the construction placed upon it by the California Supreme Court
and that construction created a sufficiently precise standard.'"
As illustrated in Banditti, a court will often supply a precise
external definition to an imprecise term if it finds that one is commonly
used in the industry involved. The willingness of a court to supply an
external definition to a standard should be influenced by a further
factor: the types of standards which had been promulgated in sur-
rounding locales. If a court observed that the surrounding locales were
uniformly using the same precise standard, it might be willing to define
the imprecise standard before it in terms of that precise standard.'"
Absent a definition in general usage, industry practice or other
standards, a court will not generally attempt to create a precise defini-
tion for an ambiguous term. Although the reason for not supplying
a definition is often unexplained, a rationale can be constructed around
a number of other pertinent considerations. First, supplying a definition
where one is not readily available from custom and usage would
amount to legislation and, as such, should be within the sole province
of the legislature.'" Second, the individual who is alleged to have
violated the imprecise standard would not have had the advantage of
any precise definition that the court might add. If, on the other hand,
there were a precise definition available, the individual would at least
have a guideline in regulating his conduct. Finally, the imprecise term
may be one which is inherently incapable of being precisely defined.
101 Id. at 17.
102 Id. at 16.
103
 Id. at 18.
104 Id .
108 See, e.g., Hoellinger v. MoIzhon, 77 N.D. 108, 110, 41 N.W.2d 217, 219 (1950).
108 Cf. Anderson v. Carlson, 171 Neb. 741, 745, 107 N.W.2d 535, 538 (1961) ;
Murphy Motor Sales, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 122 Vt. 121, 124, 165 A.2d 341, 343 (1960).
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When a court refuses to supply a precise external definition to
an ambiguous term a due process problem arises. The cases which have
considered statutes containing such imprecise terms have reached
seemingly irregular decisions on their constitutional validity.'" Statutes
containing terms such as "unjust or unreasonable rate or chargem" or
"reasonable profit"' have been held to be unconstitutionally vague,
while those containing terms such as "reasonable allowance"' or
"unjust and unreasonable" rentm have been upheld.
The irregularity of the decisions can be attributed to a subjective
weighing process by the courts, balancing the loss to the individual
resulting from upholding the standard against the public injury if it is
invalidated." 2
 The loss to the individual can be determined by evalu-
ating the activity that an individual may believe is unlawful under
the standard. If the individual would believe that that standard in-
validates a broad range of conduct, then the loss to the individual if the
standard is upheld is large, since he will not engage in any of that con-
duct for fear of violating the standard. 113
 In the case of manufacturing
processes, this may mean the shutdown of factories for fear of viola-
tion of the standard.
Balanced against the individual's loss is the public injury which
would result if the standard were invalidated. A major factor in deter-
mining the public's injury is the availability of other more precise
standards or enforcement methods that would accomplish virtually the
same end as the standard under consideration.'" Obviously, if it is
found that other standards or enforcement methods which are founded
upon more precise terms are available, then the injury to the public
resulting from invalidation of the standard is small.
The vagueness principles outlined above are likely to have an
effect on standards aimed at control of three types of pollutants:
smoke, gases and odors. Smoke control is a major element of effective
air pollution control. Historically, it was one of the first attempts at
107 Compare Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 (1927) (the Court stated
that "it will not do to hold an average man to the peril of an indictment for the unwise
exercise of his economic or business knowledge involving so many factors of varying
effect that neither the person to decide in advance nor the jury to try him after the fact
can safely and certainly decide the result."), with Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373,
377 (1913) (the Court stated that "the Iaw is full of instances where a man's fate
depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some
matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong, not only may he incur a fine or a short
imprisonment, as here; he may incur the penalty of death.").
108
 See United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
100
 Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927).
110 United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513 (1942).
111 Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922).
112 Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, supra note 99,
at 95-96.
113 Id. at 94.
114 Id. at 95.
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control because smoke is visible and, therefore, people were aware of
its existence." 5 A number of ambiguous standards have been created
using such language as "unnecessary and unreasonable smoke."'"
One of these standards came before the Appellate Division of the
California Superior Court in People v. San Pedro Lumber Co." 7 The
court held that a citizen could not discover in advance whether his
discharge of smoke would be held to violate the standard. The court
noted that, if a limiting definition were available from other standards
or custom and usage, it could use that definition to uphold the standard.
It could, however, find no such limiting definition. Although it
recognized the existence of other, more precise, smoke control standards
in California, it would not use these to narrow the standard before it
because there was no reference in the standard before it to these more
precise standards.
Although there is no doubt that the court was correct in finding
that "unnecessary and unreasonable smoke" is ambiguous, a full ap-
praisal of the decision can be made only through an independent ex-
amination of the availability of limiting definitions and the public
interest in upholding the standard. In this case there was available a
standard based on the Ringelmann Smoke Chartm that is in such
common usage in California and throughout the country that it is, in
effect, synonymous with "unnecessary and unreasonable smoke." The
standard prohibits discharges which are as dark or darker than section
two on the chart. The chart is used by placing it approximately 50
feet from an observer. When viewed from this distance, each of the
four rectangular sections of the chart appears as a different shade of
gray. Estimates of the density of a discharge of smoke are made by
comparing the shade of the smoke to that section of the chart which
most nearly resembles it.
Since the Ringelmann Chart smoke control standard is in such
common use, it would appear that the court in San Pedro Lumber
should have used it as a limiting definition for the vague language it
had before it. If it had reached that stage, there is little doubt that the
court would have upheld the standard before it. The Ringelmann
115 See U.S. Dep't of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Information Circular 8333: Ringel-
mann Smoke Chart 1 (1967), which discussed the use of the Ringelmann Smoke Chart in
a smoke ordinance enacted as early as 1910 in Boston, Massachusetts.
116 See People v. San Pedro Lumber Co., Super. Ct. No. CR A 2677 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct., filed Jan. 25, 1951), where the court considered the Los Angeles, Cal.,
Municipal Code 37.19.1 which provided that no person by himself, or his employee
or agent, or as an employee or agent of another, shall cause, suffer or permit to be dis-
charged from any source whatsoever within the City of Los Angeles any unnecessary or
unreasonable smoke, dust, soot or fumes."
117 Super. Ct. No. CR A 2677 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct., filed Jan. 25, 1951).
118 See note 115 supra. On the widespread use of the Ringelmann Smoke Chart, see
1967 Hearings 1556.
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Chart standard has been held by the California courts to be sufficiently
precise to withstand constitutional challenge. 119
Once the court overlooked the possibility of supplying a precise
definition, however, it was almost necessarily led to the conclusion that
the standard was invalid. Upholding a standard prohibiting the emis-
sion of "unnecessary and unreasonable smoke" would impose a sub-
stantial burden on a person who is emitting smoke. There appears to
be a large range of conduct in which this person would not engage
because it would be impossible for him to determine if he is emitting
"unnecessary and unreasonable smoke." In fact, an individual might
be hesitant to emit any smoke at all, fearing that a court might hold
even the slightest emission to be "unnecessary and unreasonable." As
a result, the vagueness in the standard could result in curtailment of
manufacturing processes or private incineration where smoke is likely
to be emitted.'
The public harm if this standard were invalidated and no other
smoke control standard were available would be quite large. The harm-
ful health effects, both physical and psychological, and the impairment
of property values, all of which result from smoke, would not be con-
trolled. Yet, this large potential harm resulting from invalidation of
the standard is unlikely to materialize, since the precise standard
based on the Ringelmann Chart is available as an alternative.
There is some doubt, however, whether the Ringelmann standard
would be as effective in controlling smoke. The Ringelmann Chart
standard is not as flexible as a standard using reasonableness or
necessity as a base. Situations may occur where an individual is
emitting smoke which is allowable under the Ringelmann Chart stand-
ard, but which is nevertheless unreasonable in the sense that it is
resulting in damage to health or property 121
 Conceivably, the vague
standard could have been used to prohibit such emissions, and in this
respect its probable invalidity would appear to impair effective smoke
control. This impairment, however, is likely to be more than counter-
balanced by two additional factors. First, the standard founded upon
the Ringelmann Chart has been widely accepted apparently because
it has proved to prohibit most harmful smoke. Therefore, the instances
where the emission of smoke allowable by the Ringelmann Chart
standard does cause harm are likely to be few. Second, the standard
119 See People v. International Steel Corp., 102 Cal. App. 2d 935, 226 P.2d 587 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1951) ; People v. Plywood Mfrs., 137 Cal. App. 2d 859, 291 P.2d 587
(App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 929 (1956).
120 See p. 730 supra.
121 Such a situation might well occur where the geographic and prevailing wind
conditions combine to create an abnormally slow dispersion of the smoke which is
emitted, thereby creating a "build-up" of smoke even though there is compliance with
the standard.
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based upon the Ringelmann Chart appears easier to use than the
vague standard, since it eliminates much guesswork by an enforcement
agency as to whether an individual is violating the standard. In addi-
tion, it appears to be easier to prove a violation of the Ringelmann
Chart standard. With the standard prohibiting "unnecessary and un-
reasonable smoke" extensive time and effort would be required to
establish that an emission was "unreasonable and unncessary." Con-
sequently, there appears to be little foundation for doubts regarding
the effectiveness of the Ringelmann Chart for smoke control.
The regulation of the emission of gases is a second area which
has received considerable attention. As in the case of smoke, ambigu-
ous standards regulating the emission of gases have been enacted to
achieve flexibility.'" For example, a typical standard prohibits the
emission of "gases . . . in such places or manner as to be detrimental
to any person, or to the public by endangering the health, comfort and
safety of any person, or of the public or in such manner as to cause
injury or damage to property or business . . . . "123 Although there are
no decisions on the constitutional validity of such standards, it is clear
that they would be found unconstitutional unless a court is willing to
supply a precise definition or finds it in the public interest to uphold
them.
The problem here is somewhat different from that created by
the vagueness of the smoke control standards. A court would not find,
as in the case of smoke, any generally accepted standard for any
particular gas.' 24 Therefore, it probably would not be willing to create
a limiting definition and use it to make a gas standard precise.
Since the balancing process is reached, however, the constitutional
analysis of smoke control and gas control standards lead to similar
results. Certainly, the private harm from the imprecision in the stand-
ard is the same whether a gas or smoke control standard is involved.
Likewise, the public harm is similar if the standard is invalidated
since precise standards could be used for gas control with some loss
in flexibility.'" As a result, absent a limiting definition, a gas control
122 See, e.g., Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 1318, Oct. 15, 1958; Baltimore,
Md., Ordinance 358, § 7A, April 9, 1956; Birmingham, Mich., Ordinance 450, § 2, April
5, 1954. The ordinances are reprinted in U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare,
Digest of Municipal Air Pollution Ordinances (1962).
123 See, e.g., Birmingham, Mich., Ordinance 450, § 2, April 5, 1954 (U.S. Dep't of
Health, Education and Welfare, Digest of Municipal Air Pollution Ordinances 182-83
(1962)).
124 The federal government is presently developing air quality criteria for use in
setting emission standards. Thus far, air quality criteria have been developed solely for
sulfur dioxide. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Air Quality Criteria for
Sulfur Oxides (1967). Criteria for other important pollutants are also being developed,
and they will be ready for publication in the near future. 1967 Hearings 1154.
125 There can be no doubt that a precise standard can be set to regulate the emis-
sion of most gases. Pennsylvania has adopted air quality criteria for some of the major
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standard using terms such as "unnecessary" or "unreasonable" should
be found to be unconstitutionally vague.
A final area of air pollution control which has been particularly
troublesome is regulation of the emission of odors. Standards created
for the control of odors invariably contain ambiguous terms, such as
"disagreeable or obnoxious odors." In Verona v. Sha the New
Jersey Superior Court found this standard unconstitutionally vague,
since people are affected differently by smells.'
In Verona, the court found the standard unconstitutionally vague
without reference to the possibility of limiting definitions or to the
public interest that would be injured if the standard were struck down.
Even if the court had explored the possibility of supplying such a
standard with a precise definition it is unlikely that it would have found
a precise definition to use. There is no objective standard by which to
measure all types of odors.128 Any such standard must be subjective.
Each specific odor, such as onion smell, may have an objective stand-
ard of measurement, but it would be impossible to have one for each
type of odor. In essence, terms such as "disagreeable or obnoxious
odors" are inherently incapable of being precisely defined.
gases such as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, oxidants, hydrogen sulfide and carbon
monoxide. Hearings on S. 780 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 2396 (1967). It is then
only one short step to set precise emission standards from these criteria. After a standard
has been set, samples of emissions may be subjected to laboratory analysis to determine the
content of that type gas in the emission. Id. at 2397. This is not to suggest, however, that
such precise standards may not be subject to constitutional attack upon other grounds to
be discussed later in this comment.
126 92 N.J. Super. 65, 222 A.2d 145 (Essex County Ct. 1966).
- 127 The force of Verona is somewhat weakened by Department of Health v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp., 36 U.S.L.W. 2679 (N.J. Super. Ct., App, Div., April 17, 1968).
In Owens-Corning, the court upheld a section of the New Jersey Air Pollution Code
which provided: "no person shall cause, suffer, allow or permit to be emitted into the
outdoor atmosphere substances in quantities which shall result in air pollution." "Air
pollution" is defined in the New Jersey Air Pollution Control Act to include odors of
quantities and characteristics as to be likely to be injurious to public welfare, to human,
plant or animal life, or to property, or as to be likely unreasonably to interfere with
the enjoyment of life and property. See note 7 supra. After finding that the Air Pollution
Code provision was not overbroad, the court went on to find that the Department of
Health could regulate odors under this provision since odors come within the Air Pollu-
tion Control Act definition of "air pollution" and were "substances" within the meaning
of the Air Pollution Code.
Special circumstances were present in Owens-Corning, however, that may make it
distinguishable from Verona. In Owens-Corning, the defendant knew for more than six
years that the Department of Health considered its emissions to be in violation of the
Code. The defendant attempted, unsuccessfully, to stop or reduce the emissions. These
facts led the court to conclude that the defendant could not seriously contend that it was
not sufficiently informed of the Code standard. As a result, the case can be read to say
that the defendant was not a proper person to allege vagueness, but does not have to
be read to say that no one could have shown vagueness sufficient to make the statute
unenforceable as to him.
128 Bishop, Air Pollution from Industrial Operations and Its Control, in National
Conference on AirPollutionproceedings 93 (1963)..
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Nor is a balance of public injury against private injury likely to
save the standard. The burden imposed on the individual as a result
of upholding a vague odor standard is as substantial as that imposed
by a vague gas or smoke standard. Many industries, particularly
those which manufacture chemicals, must emit large quantities of
odors to make their product. As a result, fear of violation of the stand-
ard may cause these industries to curtail or discontinue production.
The public interest in upholding the standard, however, is much
smaller than that in upholding the smoke or gas standards. Although
the presence of "disagreeable or obnoxious odors" many interfere with
the use and enjoyment of property and create adverse psychological
health effects, these odors will not have any direct physical effects on
health or property. Therefore, the magnitude of harm which might
result from allowing the unregulated emission of odors is not as large
as the harm which might result from allowing the unregulated discharge
of some other air contaminant. On the other hand, there appears to be
no available precise standard directed specifically at odors which will
eliminate their potential harm. An odor, however, does not usually
exist as a separate entity, but is often accompanied by some other air
contaminant. Therefore, to the extent that the emission of these other
air contaminants may be controlled by precise standards, the potential
public harm from an odor is reduced.
On balance, it appears that the result in Verona was correct—
the standard is unconstitutionally vague. A corollary to this conclusion
is that all odor standards are bad because it is impossible to find a more
objective one. Although it appears that, at least in part, odors will be
controlled as a by-product of the control of other air contaminants
creating the odors, optimum control of odors will not result.
The scientific data for many air contaminants has been sketchy
or inconsistent, and there may not be enough data for analysis and
creation of precise standards for these contaminants. Moreover, to
the extent that sufficiently precise standards have been promulgated
with sketchy or inconsistent data, constitutional problems may arise.
Fourteenth amendment due process of law would not be present in the
enforcement of a standard in which the prohibitions bear no relation to
the interest that is being protected.' A constitutional attack on air
pollution control standards upon the ground that there is no such
reasonable relation may take two forms. First, a standard may be
129 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502'(1934). it should also be noted that, as with
the first due process requirement previously mentioned, this second requirement applies to.
permits issued in the "permit system" as well as to standards promulgated in the "pro-
hibitory system." Such a result obtains since a permit, by hypothesis, is issued pursuant
to a regulating standard.
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invalidated if it has no justifiable foundation in fact.'" Second, a
standard may be invalidated if there exists a less restrictive alternative
that will accomplish the same end as the standard in question."'
An air pollution control standard can be invalidated under the
first method only when it can be shown that there is a lack of scientific
knowledge to demonstrate a causal relationship between the given
standard and the injury to public health, welfare or property.'" Even
if a standard is enacted with little or no scientific knowledge, however,
the defendant's burden of proving this is almost insurmountable. A
strong presumption of validity exists in favor of any standard. 133 This
presumption of validity may be rebutted only by proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the standard has no scientific basis.'" In the
case of certain air contaminants about which scientific knowledge is
still sketchy"' it may be possible to rebut the presumption of validity.
As a practical matter, however, most standards are not promulgated
unless they are based on information which has been published and
confirmed either by independent investigators or an air pollution
staff."" This information would tend to make the presumption of
validity in favor of these standards virtually irrebuttable since it
would always raise a reasonable doubt that such standards did, in
fact, have a scientific basis.
To illustrate the difficulty of showing that a standard has no basis
in fact, one may consider the debate presently taking place over pro-
hibitory standards for sulfur dioxide. The United States Department
of Health, Education and Welfare established air quality criteria for
sulfur dioxide"' after a detailed study of its effects upon health and
property. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare reported
that sulfur dioxide concentrations above 0.1 parts per million parts of
air over a 24-hour period would injure health. From this air quality
criterion, sulfur dioxide emission control standards can be enacted
to keep the concentration of sulfur dioxide in the air below that
specified in the criterion.'"
130
 See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., Inc., 224 Ark.
558, 566, 275 S.W.2d 455, 460 (1955).
131 This is the principle advanced by Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative
Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 Marv. L. Rev. 1463 (1967).
132
 See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., Inc., 224 Ark. 558,
275 S.W.2d 455 (1955).
133
 See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959) ; People v.
Tatje, 203 Misc. 949, 953, 121 N.Y.S.2d 147, 151 (N.Y. City Magis. Ct. 1953).
134
 See People v. Tatje, 203 Misc. 949, 953, 121 N.Y.S.2d 147, 151 (N.Y. City Magis.
Ct. 1953).
135 Nitrogen dioxide is an example. See 1967 Hearings 1146-47.
136 This is the practice in California. Maga & Goldsmith, Standards for Air Quality
in California, 10 J. Air Pollution Control Ass'n 453, 454 (1960).
137
 See 1967 Hearings 1140.
138
 See U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Air Quality Criteria for
Sulfur Oxides iv (1967).
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The Department of Health, Education and Welfare's criterion
has been subjected to criticism on the basis that there is presently no
valid scientific evidence demonstrating the relationship of any given
quantity of sulfur dioxide to "significant" adverse health and prop-
erty effects.'" The critics believe that much more work needs to be .
done before an accurate scientific judgment can be made on the effects
of sulfur dioxide. As a practical matter, however, the testimony of
such critics would be insufficient to show a lack of foundation in fact
of a sulfur dioxide standard. The strong presumption in favour of
such a standard could never be overcome, since the findings of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare would always leave
some reasonable doubt in favor of the scientific basis of the standard.
It is not suggested, however, that this method of constitutional
attack will never succeed against air pollution control standards.
Standards which have been promulgated without the substantial basis
of either a Department of Health, Education and Welfare criterion or
another published scientific work relating the emissions to adverse
health and property effects are certainly vulnerable. One example is a
standard regulating the emission of nitrogen dioxide, a gas for which
there is relatively little information concerning its effect upon man.m
The second method by which a standard may be attacked as
having no reasonable relation to the interest protected is through the
less-restrictive-alternative principle."'" This method is similar to the
first except that it places a burden on the defendant of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that a less restrictive standard accomplishes the
same purposes as the challenged standard equally effectively. 142 The
factual basis of the challenged standard does not have to be attacked
directly. The less-restrictive-alternative principle is a good basis of
attack where scientific knowledge is present to show the need for some
standard. If, in this case, the defendant can show that the underlying
scientific evidence does not demonstrate the need for a standard as
strict as the one challenged to protect the public health effectively, the
challenged standard may be invalidated. Where scientific evidence is
lacking, however, the less-restrictive-alternative principle is not a good
theory of attack. In such a case, it is difficult to find scientific evidence
that wilI support the proposition that the standard is too strict. Of
course, the fact that scientific evidence is lacking may go to a show-
ing of inadequate foundation for the standard and, thus, result in a
finding of unconstitutionality.
139 Clean Air News, Sept. 6, 1967, at 5-6.
149 See 1967 Hearings 1146-47.
141 See generally Struve, supra note 131.
142 Id. at 1463.
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C. Considerations of Public and Private Interests
To a certain extent the due process requirements of the four-
teenth amendment discussed above compel the administrative agency
to balance various interests involved in air pollution control when
promulgating and enforcing standards. Yet, the fourteenth amendment
can impose only the outer boundaries of fairness. Within these bound-
aries, the control legislation must still strike a proper balance between
the competing interests involved.
In order to understand the attempts of existing statutes to strike
a proper balance, it is first necessary to list the interests in air pollution
control. These are: (1) the public's need for clean air; (2) the need
of industry, which emits air contaminants, to be able to operate effi-
ciently and - economically; and (3) the public's need in having industry
continue to operate so that it may employ people, produce a particular
product, and stimulate the economy. If air pollution control is to strike
a proper balance among these competing and conflicting interests, the
legislature or administrative agency must take the interests into con-
sideration when promulgating and enforcing standards and also when
granting, denying or revoking permits. Although legislators, ideally,
strive to be fair to competing interests, complete fairness is not always
possible within the confines of the prohibitory or permit system. A
great deal of arbitrariness is present because of the practical limitations
on the ability of a state or municipality to police and enforce the
standards. Two examples will demonstrate this necessary arbitrariness
in the standards.
As noted above,'" standards based on the Ringelmann Chart are
sufficiently precise to withstand constitutional challenge. It is this
precision, however, that results in arbitrariness. For example, a typical
standard may prohibit the discharge into the air of any smoke which
is dark, darker, or as opaque as section 2 of the Ringelmann Smoke
Chart for more than three minutes during any one hour.' One who
emits smoke which is barely a shade below section 2 does not violate
the standard even though he discharges smoke 24 hours a day. As
a result, the emission of one who complies with the standard may be
considerably more harmful to health than the emission of one who does
not; yet, as a practical matter, it is difficult to create a standard that
takes such a result into account. A sliding scale, juxtaposing darkness
or opacity of smoke with the amount of smoke being released each day
could be used, but it would necessitate an inspector's spending too much
time in observing one emission source in order to detect violations. It
would appear that the arbitrariness is a necessary result if administra-
tive impracticability is to be avoided.
113 See p. 732 supra.
144 See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 24242 (West 1967).
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A second example is those standards which prohibit the use of cer-
tain fuels' or prohibit particular processes, such as incineration."
Although the use of these fuels or processes may result in increased air
pollution, this is not necessarily the case. The danger from an emission
source using these fuels or processes may be minimized by the use of
pollution control devices." 7
 For one who can obtain control devices
and reduce his output so that he does not violate any emission standard,
an input or process prohibition seems unduly harsh. The harshness of
the standard, however, may be necessary in view of the cost of pro-
mulgating and enforcing a more flexible standard based on the output
of air contaminants. The money and time which must be expended to
investigate and prove violation of an emission standard based on output
would appear to be much greater than that needed to investigate and
prove violation of a standard based on input. 1 i8
 All the inspector need
do to detect a violation of an input standard is to observe the products
being placed into the industrial process.
Although the practical limitations upon the state and municipality
in enforcing standards may necessitate a certain amount of arbitrari-
ness, for the most part, harshness to the various competing parties
involved in air pollution control can be somewhat diminished by con-
sideration of the interests of all parties at the different stages of con-
trol. Such consideration is written into air pollution statutes in three
ways.
The majority of statutes state that before a standard can be
adopted, notice must be given and a meeting held in which the public
is given an opportunity to be heard."° Although this allows all in-
terested parties to express their views on the proposed standard, there
is, of course, nothing which compels the body promulgating standards
to agree with them or to give any weight to their opinions in deciding
whether to enact a standard.
145 See New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 14, § 1-893-2.0(b), May 20, 1966: no
person shall use bituminous coal in fuel burning equipment for the purpose of providing
heat or hot water for any structure or any building . .." See also subsection (a) of the
same section which allows bituminous coal to be used in fuel burning equipment for
purposes other than providing heat or hot water if a control apparatus capable of
preventing the emission of at least 99% of all solid particulate matter is installed.
146 See New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 14, § 1-893-3.0, May 20, 1966, which pro-
hibits the use of refuse burning equipment.
147 An air pollution control device is a piece of equipment which removes or
reduces the quantity and quality of air contaminants which are emitted into the
atmosphere.
148 Consider the differences in cost between investigating and proving that harmful
amounts of a particular gas or odor are being emitted and investigating and proving that
excess amounts of a particular fuel are being used.
140 See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2C-8 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1967); N.Y.
Pub. Health Law § 1276(2) (McKinney Supp. 1967); Va. Code Ann. § 10-17.18(b)
(Supp. 1966).
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A more formal means of insuring that the competing interests will
be considered in promulgating and enforcing standards is to establish a
board or commission whose membership consists of various technical
and interest groups: industry, the public, government, and the medical
and engineering professions.'° Placing the various interest groups on
150 See Ariz. Rev, Stat. Ann. § 36-1704 (Supp. May 1967) (hearing board to be
made up of persons who are "knowledgeable in the field of air pollution") ; Ark. Stat. Ann.
§ 36-1903(a) (Supp. 1967) (Arkansas Air and Water Pollution Control Com-
mission made up of persons appointed by the Board of Health, Game and Fish
Commission, Oil and Gas Commission, Soil and Water Commission, State Forestry
Commission and the Governor (to represent industry, municipalities, and agricultural
interests)) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 66-29-7(1) (Supp. 1967) (Variance Board to be
made up of a professional engineer, a physician or toxicologist, three representatives of
industry, and three representatives of the public) ; P.A. 754, § 2, 1967 Conn. Laws (Conn.
Leg. Serv. 1080 (1967)) (Commission to be made up of a physician, a professional
engineer, a representative of industry, an electric utility employee, and six representatives
of the public) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 111%, § 240.4 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (Control Board to
be made up of the Director of Public Health, a professional engineer, a physician, a
conservationist, a representative of industry, a representative of labor, a person engaged
in municipal government, and two representatives of the public) ; Ind. Ann. Stat. § 35-4603
(Supp. 1967) (Control Board to be made up of the Secretary of the Board of Health,
a physician, an engineer, a representative of agriculture, a representative of industry,
a representative of municipal government, and a representative of the general public) ;
H. File 480, § 3(1), 1967 Iowa Acts (Iowa Leg. Serv. 277 (1967)) (Commission to be
made up of the Commissioner of Public Health, a professional engineer, a physician,
a representative of industry, a conservationist, a representative of labor, a representative
of government, and two representatives of the public) ; S. Bill 428, § 4, 1967 Kan.
Laws (Commission to be made up of the state health officer, the Director of
the Department of Economic Development, the Director of the Department of Labor, the
Secretary of the Board of Agriculture, a representative of industry, a representative of
local government, a representative of the public, and one other member) ; Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 224.420(2) (Supp. 1967) (Commission to be made up of the Commissioner of
Health, the Commissioner of Commerce, the Attorney General, the Commissioner of
Natural Resources, the Commissioner of Agriculture, a representative of the public,
three representatives of industy at least one of which is an engineer, an engineering
professor, and a representative of a local Control District) ; La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 40:2203 (1965) (Commission to be made up of the President of the State Board of
Health, the Director of the State Board of Commerce and Industry, the Commissioner
of Agriculture, a professional engineer, a physician, a representative of industry and a
representative of municipal government) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 14.58(3) (Supp. 1965)
(Commission to be made up of the Commissioner of Health, the Director of Conserva-
tion, the Director of Agriculture, two representatives of industry of which one shall be a
professional engineer, two representatives of local pollution control bodies, a physician,
and a representative of the public) ; Miss. Code Ann. § 7106-113(a) (Supp. 1966) (Air
and Water Pollution Control Commission to be made up of the Director of the Division
of Sanitary Engineering, the Director of the Game and Fish Commission, the State Water
Engineer, the Supervisor of the Oil and Gas Board, the Director of the Plant Board,
the Secretary of the Marine Conservation Commission, a representative of municipal
government, two representatives of industry, and a conservationist) ; Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 203.040 (Supp. 1967) (Commission to be made up of the Director of Health and
six others selected as to represent industry, labor, agriculture, municipal or county
government, and the public) ; Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 445.490, .505 (1967) (state control
hearing board to be made up of five persons chosen from a group made up of two
representatives of the public and eight persons representing agriculture, industry,
mining, construction contractors, public utilities, tourism, transportation, and the
cities and towns; county and district control hearing hoards to be made up of three
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the board encourages examination and representation of different
points of view and interests in the policy making and enforcement
process.' Representation on a control board, however, is not a
panacea. Since the board members often have full-time jobs outside the
board, it may not be possible within the time available to maintain an
effective air pollution control program.' In addition, there is a
chance that placing private interest groups on the board will serve to
to five members, one of which is to be an attorney, and one of which is to be a
professional engineer) ; H. Bill 352, §1-127:80(III), 1967 N.H. Laws (Commission to be
made up of three representatives of industry, a representative of municipal government, a
physician, a representative of the field of recreation and three representatives of the
public); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 1268(1) (McKinney Supp. 1967) (Board to be made
up of the Commissioners of the Departments of Health, Agriculture, Commerce, Con-
servation and Labor, a physician, a professional engineer, a representative of industry,
and a representative of a political subdivision) ; H. Bill 689, § 1-3704.02, 1967 Ohio
Laws (Board to be made up of the Director of Health, the Director of Development,
and representatives of municipal government, industry and agriculture) ; ch. 80, § 2(E),
1967 Okla. Laws (Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 115.16 (1967)) (Council to be made up of a pro-
fessional engineer, a professor of engineering, and representatives of industry (3), agricul-
ture and municipal government) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 4005 (1964) (Commission to be
made up of the Directors of the Departments of Health, Commerce, Labor, Mines
and Agriculture, a toxicologist, three representatives of industry of which one shall be
a professional engineer, another professional engineer, and a member of the public) ;
S.C. Code Ann. § 70-104 (Supp. 1965) (Authority to be made up of the state health
officer and two members of the Board of Health, representatives of the cotton and
paper and pulp industries, a conservationist, a representative of municipal government,
a farmer, and two representatives of labor) ; Tenn. Code Ann. § 53-3411 (Supp. 1967)
(Board to be made up of the Commissioner of Public Health, a professional engineer,
a physician, a conservationist, a manufacturer, a judge, a person engaged in municipal
government, and two representatives of industry) ; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4477-5,
§ 3 (Supp. 1967) (Board to be made up of the Commissioner of Health, the Director
of the State Industrial Commission, the Director of the Animal Health Commission, a
professional engineer, a physician, a representative of industry, a representative of
municipal government, and two representatives of the public) ; Utah Code Ann.
§ 26-24-4 (Supp. 1967) (Council to be made up of the Director of the Department of
Health, a physician, a professional engineer, and representatives of municipal govern-
ment, agriculture, the mining industry, the fuel industry, manufacturing and the public) ;
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.94.300 (Supp. 1967) (Board to be made up of the Director
of Health, an educator, a representative of the public, a representative of labor, a city
official, a member of the Board of County Commissioners, a representative of agricul-
ture, and two representatives of industry) ; W. Va. Code Ann. § 16-20-4 (Supp. 1967)
(Commission to be made up of the State Director of Health, the Commissioner of
Agriculture, two representatives of industry, and three representatives of the public) ;
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-490 (Supp. 1967) (Council to be made up of a representative of
the Board of Health, the Commissioner of Agriculture, the Chairman of the Land and
Water Conservation Commission, a representative of municipal government, three
representatives of industry, and two representatives of the public).
151 One widely held view is that in almost all cases the public interest will be
successfully realized only if full participation by affected interest groups is allowed and
encouraged. See Council of State Governments, State Air Pollution Control Act, in
26 Suggested State Legislation A-4 (1967).
152 See Statement by Lewis Green, Chairman of the Missouri Air Conservation
Commission: "I am Chairman of this Commission only as a part time hobby." Hearings
on S. 780 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on
Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 991 (1967).
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channel favoritism,' although it is more likely that the need to com-
promise will be so overriding that any favoritism will not affect the
ultimate decisions.'" These disadvantages have caused some states to
turn to a departmental type of organization with full-time officials in
charge of promulgating and administering standards.' The depart-
mental organization also has the advantage of efficiency and orderly
administration, but, of course, the interests affected by air pollution
control legislation have no decision-making power. A few states have
adopted a compromise between a part-time control board with repre-
sentation from the interest groups and a full-time control board with
no representation. Under these statutes, the State Board of Health'
is empowered to administer the act, and the Governor is authorized to
appoint an Air Pollution Advisory Council comprised of representa-
tives of the various technical and interest groups." The Council,
however, can make only recommendations to the Board and advise on
standards which are presented to it by the Board. Although the various
interests are represented on the Advisory Council, they have no real
decision-making power.
It is submitted that a more advantageous type of administrative
organization would be a mixed commission comprised of both state
air pollution officials and representatives from technical and interest
groups. This kind of organization is beneficial because full-time public
officials on the Commission are paid to spend their time on air pollution
matters, unlike the representatives from various interest groups who
hold full-time jobs outside the Commission. At the same time, this
kind of organizational structure fulfills the need to balance the com-
peting social and economic interests involved.
A further means of insuring that conflicting interests will be
balanced by an administrative agency or board is to make considera-
tion of the interests mandatory either when the agency is promulgating
153 The National Association of Counties, in a Community Action Guide for Air
Pollution Control, has stated that representatives of industry should not be allowed to sit
on decision-making bodies because of their vested interests. See 1967 Hearings 1378.
154 For a discussion of the arguments pro and con, see W. Boyer, Bureaucracy on
Trial (1964).
155 See Ga. Code Ann. §§ 88-903, -904 (Stipp. 1967); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 47-62
(Supp. 1965); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 111, § 142A (1958), as amended, (Supp. 1966);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-14-5 (Supp. 1967).
156 It has been customary practice to assign air pollution control responsibilities
to the Health Department rather than to any other unit of state government. See
Council of State GovernMents, State Air Pollution Control Act, in 26 Suggested State
Legislation A-5 (1967).
157
 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1703 (Supp. May 1967); Cal. Health & Safety
Code § 24356 (West 1967) (Bay Area Control Act) ; ch. 1545, § 5-39022, 1967 Cal. Laws
(Cal. Leg. Serv. 2767 (1967)) (Mulford-Carrell Air Resources Act) ; Md. Ann. Code
art. 43, § 695 (Supp. 1967); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 69-3908 (Supp. 1967); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 26:2C-3.2 (Supp. 1967); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 23-25-4(b) (Supp. 1966); ch.
83, § 6-144.37, 1967 Wis. Laws.
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standards, when it is enforcing them, or at both times. 158 At the en-
forcement stage, the agency may consider the interests when it decides
whether to issue an order against one who is violating the standard,
. 	 158 All of the state air pollution statutes or administrative procedures acts have
provisions for judicial review of an administrative rule, order or variance. Any person
aggrieved by the administrative action has a right to judicial review and the scope of
this review is usually set forth clearly in the statute.
Many states provide for judicial review to determine if the administrative order is
erroneous in law, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, clearly erroneous or the
like. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 66-29-13 (Supp. 1967) (refers to Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 3-16-5(7) (1963) which sets out rules for judicial review); P.A. 754, § 13, 1967 Conn.
,Laws (Conn. Leg. Serv. 1082-83 (1967)) (scope of review has been established by
judicial decision. Sec Jaffe v. Department of Health, 135 Conn. 339, 64 A.2d 330 (1949))
H. Bill 352, § 1-125:82, 1967 N.H. Laws (refers to N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541:13
(1955) which defines the scope of review) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-14-7 (Supp. 1967)
(applies only to rules and regulations); W. Va. Code Ann. § 16-20-7 (1966) (scope of
review set out in Administrative Procedures Act, W. Va. Code Ann. § 29A-5-4(g)
(1966)).
Some states provide for a trial de novo to review any decisions of the administrative
agency. See Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 82-1906(7), -1906(9) (Supp. 1967) (administrative
finding is prima facie valid); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 24323 (West 1967) (Air
Pollution Control District Act); Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, § 6012(e) (Supp. 1966) (unclear,
but specifies that the superior court shall bear and determine the matter as a suit in law
and equity); Ga. Code Ann. § 88-915 (Supp. 1967) (refers to Ga. Code Ann. § 88-305(a)
(Supp. 1967) which deals with judicial review) ; Hawaii Rev. Laws § 47-73 (Supp.
1965) ; Idaho Code Ann. § 39-2920(4) (Supp. 1967) ; H. File 480, § 10, 1967 Iowa
Acts. (Iowa Leg. Serv. 282 (1967)); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 77.305(2) (1963) (Air
Pollution Control District Act) ; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:2213 (1965) ; Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 14.58(13) (Supp. 1965) ; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 445.575 (1967) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-14-11
(Supp. 1967) (applies only to enforcement); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.5 (Supp. 1967) ;
H. Bill 689, § 1-3704.06, 1967 Ohio Laws; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 23-25-10 (Supp.
1966); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4477-5, § 11 (Supp. 1967); Va. Code Ann.
§ 10-17.27 (Supp. 1966) ; ch. 238, §§ 36, 48(3), 1967 Wash. Laws (Wash. Leg. Serv. 582,
585 (1967)). Even though a statute may expressly provide for review through a
trial de novo, some courts refuse to exercise this independent judgment because they
feel it is a usurpation of the administrative function. See Peck, The Scope of Judicial
Review of Administrative Action in Washington, 38 Wash. L. Rev. 55, 56-61 (1958).
Other courts follow the literal meaning of the statutes, especially where the court de-
cides that the administrative agency has exercised a judicial function. See Common-
wealth v. Emerick, 373 Pa. 338, 96 A.2d 370 (1953).
Some states provide for review to determine if the administrative order is supported
by substantial evidence. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1716 (Supp. May 1967) (scope
of review has been established by Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-910 (1956) and by judicial
decision. See cases collected in Davis, An Administrative Procedure Act for Arizona, 2
Ariz. L. Rev. 17, 35-36 (1966)) ; Cal. Health & Safety Code § 24368.4 (West 1967)
(Bay Area Control Act, refers to Cal. Civ. Code § 1094.5 (West 1955) which established
substantial evidence rule) ; ch. 1545, § 5-39506, 1967 Cal. Laws (Cal. Leg. Serv. 2785-86
(1967)) (Mulford-Carrell Air Resources Act) ; ch. 67-436, § 18, 1967 Fla. Laws (Fla. Sess.
Law Serv. 938 (1967)) (scope of review of administrative orders has been set by judicial
decisions. See Degroot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1957)); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 35-4606
(Supp. 1967) (refers to Ind. Ann. Stat. § 63-3018 (1961) which defines the scope of
review); S. Bill 428, § 14(c), 1967 Kan. Laws (scope of review has been established by
judicial decision. See Timmons v. McGaughey, 193 Kan. 171, 392 P.2d 835 (1964)) ; Md.
Ann. Code art. 43, § 700 (Supp. 1967) (refers to Md. Ann. Code art. 41, § 255 (1965)
where the scope of review is set out); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 203.130 (Supp. 1967) (refers
to Mo. Ann. Stat. § 536.140(2) (Supp. 1967) which defines the scope of review) ;
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 69-3917(4)(c) (Supp. 1967); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2C-20
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or whether to grant a variance from the standard, or both. Although
the legislatures of most of the states recognize the need to consider
interests at some stage in the control process, the statutes differ as to
when the agency must consider the interests.'" They also differ as to
(1964), as amended, (Supp. 1967) (scope of review has been established by judicial
decision. See Thomas v. Board of Educ., 89 N.J. Super. 327, 215 A.2d 35 (Super. Ct.
1965)) ; N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 1283(1) (McKinney Supp. 1967) (refers to N.Y. Civ.
Prac. Law § 7803(4) (McKinney 1963) which defines the scope of review) ; ch. 80,
§ 2(I)(g), 1967 Okla. Laws (Okla. Sess. Law. Serv. 119 (1967)) (scope of review has been
established by judicial decision. See In re White, 355 P.2d 404 (Okla. 1960)) ; Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 449.805 (1965) (scope of review has been established by Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 183.480 (1965) and by judicial decision. See Bay v. State Bd. of Educ., 233 Ore. 601,
378 P.2d 558 (1963)) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 4005(g) (1964) (refers to Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 71, § 1710.44 (1962) where the scope of review is defined) ; Tenn. Code Ann. §
53-3417 (Supp. 1967) (scope of review has been established by judicial decision. See Pace
v. Garbage Disposal Dist., 390 S.W.2d 461 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965)) ; Utah Code Ann,
§ 26-24-12 (Supp. 1967) ; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 227.20 (1957) (Administrative Procedure
Act) ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-497(e), -498 (Supp, 1967) (refers to Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 9-276.32 (Supp. 1967) which sets out the scope of review).
Some states provide for judicial review in which the agency determination is
deemed prima fade true. See Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 111%2, § 240.13 (Smith-Hurd 1966)
(refers to III. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 274 (Smith-Hurd 1956) ; also requires that review be
based only on the evidence before the agency) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 224.460(2)
(Supp. 1967) (Control Act) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 70-130 (1962).
One state provides for judicial review to determine if there has been prejudicial
error. See Miss. Code Ann. § 7106-128 (Supp. 1966).
159 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1712 (Supp. May 1967) (variance proceedings) ;
Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 82-1936, -1939 (Supp. 1967) (promulgation of rules, enforcement,
variance proceedings) ; Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 24296-97 (West 1967) (Air Pollution
Control District Act-variance proceedings) ; Cal, Health & Safety Code § 24365.5
(West 1967) (Bay Area Control Act-variance proceedings) ; ch. 1545, § 5-39475, 1967
Cal. Laws (Cal. Leg. Serv. 2783 (1967)) (Mulford-Carrell Air Resources Act-variance
proceedings) ; H, Bill 1024, § 11, 1966 Colo. Laws (U.S. Dep't of Health, Education &
Welfare, Digest of State Air Pollution Laws 49-50 (1966)) (variance proceedings) ; P.A.
754, §§ 5, 14(a), 1967 Conn. Laws (Conn. Leg. Serv. 1080-81, 1083 (1967)) (promulgation
of rules, enforcement, variance proceedings) ; ch. 67-436, § 21, 1967 Fla. Laws (Ha. Sess.
Law Serv. 940 (1967)) (variance proceedings) ; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 88-906, -912 (Supp.
1967) (promulgation of rules, enforcement, variance proceedings) ; Idaho Code Ann.
§ 39-2909 (Supp. 1967) (promulgation of rules, enforcement) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 111%,
§§ 240.5-1.4, -1.11 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (enforcement, variance proceedings) ; Ind. Ann.
Stat. § 35-4604(A) (2) (Supp. 1967) (enforcement) ; H. File 480, H 4(8) (a), 13(1),
1967 Iowa Acts (Iowa Leg. Serv. 279, 282 (1967)) (enforcement, variance proceedings) ;
S. Bill 428, § 13(a), 1967 Kan. Laws (variance proceedings) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 77.260 (1963) (Air Pollution Control District Act-variance proceedings) ; Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 224.340, .410 (Supp. 1967) (Control Act-promulgation of rules, variance
proceedings) ; La. Rev, Stat. Ann. §§ 40:2204(A) (5) (ii), :2211 (1965) (enforcement,
variance proceedings) ; Md. Ann. Code art. 43, § 697(c) (Supp. 1967) (promulgation of
rules) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. H 14.58(19), (20), (21) (Supp. 1965) (variance proceedings) ;
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 203.110 (Supp. 1967) (variance proceedings) ; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
§ 69-3916 (Supp. 1967) (variance proceedings) ; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 445.525 (1967)
(promulgation of rules) ; H. Bill 352, § 1-125:83, 1967 N.H. Laws (variance proceedings) ;
N.M. Stat. Ann. H 12-14-5(B) (1), -8, -11(E) (Supp. 1967) (promulgation of rules,
enforcement, variance proceedings) ; N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 1282(3) (McKinney
Supp. 1967) (enforcement) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.2(6) (Supp. 1967) (enforcement) ;
H. Bill 689, §§ 1-3704.03(E), .03(F), .06, 1967 Ohio Laws (promulgation of rules, enforce-
ment, variance proceedings) ; ch. 80, §§ 2(I)(d), (J) (b), 1967 Okla. Laws (Okla. Sess.
Law Serv. 118, 119 (1967)) (enforcement, variance proceedings) ; Ore. Rev. Stat.
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what interests should be considered.' Where variance proceedings
are used, they differ as to whether the grant of a variance should be
§§ 449.785, .810 (1965) (promulgation of rules, variance proceedings); R.I. Gen. Laws
Ann. §§ 23-25-5(h), -15 (Supp. 1966) (enforcement, variance proceedings) ; S.C. Code
Ann. §§ 70-123.1(A) (4) (ii), -123.3 (Supp. 1965) (enforcement, variance proceedings) ;
Tenn. Code Ann. § 53-3413 (Supp. 1967) (promulgation of rules, enforcement, variance
proceedings); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4477-5; §§ 4(5) (b), 9(A) (Supp. 1967)
(enforcement, variance proceedings); Utah Code Ann. § 26-24-5(7) (Supp. 1967)
(variance proceedings) ; Va. Code Ann. § 10-17.18(e) (Supp. 1966) (promulgation of
rules, enforcement); ch. 238, § 31, 1967 Wash. Laws (Wash. Leg. Serv. 579-80 (1967))
(variance proceedings) ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-494(b), -497 (Supp. 1967) (promulgation
of rules, variance proceedings).
100 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1712 (Supp. May 1967) (variance—Hearing
Board must weigh the advantages and disadvantages of forcing compliance to the public
and to the business involved. If enforcement will result in arbitrary and unreasonable
taking of property or practical closing and elimination of a business without corresponding
benefit, other requirements are set) ; Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 82-1936, -1939 (Supp. 1967)
(promulgation of rules—quantity, characteristics and duration of contaminants; physical
condition; prevailing wind direction and velocity; atmospheric conditions; chemical
effect of contaminants in the atmosphere; character of development of area of state;
availability and economic feasibility of air cleaning devices; health effects of particular
contaminants; property damage possible from particular contaminants; effect on comfort
and conduct of business from contaminants; volume of air contaminants emitted from
a particular class of source; economic development of state; social and economic value
of air contaminant source; the maintenance of the enjoyment of the state's natural
resources; and others. Enforcement—same. Variance—harshness of requiring strict com-
pliance, including consideration of whether substantial curtailment or closing of a
business will result and whether an alternative facility or method of handling is available);
CO. Health & Safety Code §§ 24296, 24297, 24365.5 (West 1967) (Control District Act
and Bay Area Control Act; variance—Board to determine if enforcement will result in
arbitary and unreasonable taking of property or practical closing and elimination of a
business without sufficient public benefit) ; ch. 1545, § 5-39475, 1967 Cal. Laws (Cal. Leg.
Serv. 2783 (1967)) (Mulford-Carrell Air Resources Act; variance—same as Control
District and Bay Area Control Acts) ; H. Bill 1024, § 11(2), 1966 Colo. Laws (U.S. Dep't
of Health, Education & Welfare, Digest of State Air Pollution Laws 50 (1966))
(variance—Board to determine if enforcement will result in arbitrary and unreasonable
taking of property or in the practical closing of a business without sufficient public
benefit) ; P.A. 754, §§ 5, 14(a), 1967 Conn. Laws (Conn. Leg. Serv. 1080-81, 1083
(1967)) (promulgation of rules—character and degree of interference with safety,
health or use of property that is caused or threatened, the social and economic value of
the activity involved, the suitability of activity to area in which it is located, and the
practicability of reducing the discharge; enforcement—same; variance—Commission to
determine that discharges are not a danger to health, and compliance would produce
practical difficulty or hardship without sufficient public benefit); ch. 67-436, § 21, 1967
Fla. Laws (Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 940 (1967)) (variance—Commission to determine that
(a) there is no means of compliance, or (b) compliance will take a long time, or (c)
hardship will result from compliance); Ga. Code Ann. §-§ 88-906, -912 (Supp. 1967)
(promulgation of rules—the quantity, characteristics and duration of air contaminants,
the physical conditions, the prevailing wind directions and velocities, atmospheric con-
ditions, chemical effect of contaminants, predominant character of development in the
area, the priority of location in the area, availability and feasibility of air cleaning
devices, effect of contaminants on health, extent of danger to property to be expected,
effect on comfort and conduct of business from contaminants, volume of air con-
taminants from a class of sources, the economic development in the state, the social
and economic value of the source, the maintenance of the enjoyment of the state's natural
resources, and others; enforcement—same; variance—Department to determine if re-
quiring compliance will be harsh or inappropiate because of factors beyond control of
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polluter, or if compliance will result in curtailment or closing down of business, Board
must weigh the effect on heath in this determination); Idaho Code Ann. § 39-2909
(Supp. 1967) (promulgation of rules—the character and degree of injury to safety,
health or use of property caused or threatened, the social and economic value of activity
involved, suitability of activity to area, the practicability of reducing the discharge, and
generally the advantages and disadvantages of requiring compliance; enforcement—same);
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 111%, §§ 240.5-1.4, -1.11 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (enforcement—character
and degree of injury to health, general welfare and property, the social and economic
value of the source, the suitability of the source to the area, the practicability of re-
ducing the emissions; variance—Board to determine if compliance will result in arbitrary
or unreasonable taking of property or in practical closing and elimination of a business
without sufficient public benefit) Ind. Ann. Stat. § 35-4604(A) (2) (Supp. 1967) (en-
forcement—character and degree of injury to comfort, safety, health or use of property,
social and economic value of activity, the practicability of reduing the emissions) ; H.
File 480, §§ 4(8)(a), 13(1), 1967 Iowa Acts (Iowa Leg. Serv. 279, 282 (1967)) (enforce-
ment—character and degree of injury to health and property, the practicability of re-
ducing emissions, the suitability of the source to the area; variance—Commission to
determine that the emissions do not endanger or tend to endanger human health, safety
or property, and compliance will produce serious hardship without a sufficient public
benefit) ; S. Bill 428, § 13(a), 1967 Kan. Laws (variance—Commission to determine
that the emissions do not endanger human health or safety and compliance would pro-
duce serious hardship) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 224.340, .410 (Supp. 1967) (Control
Act; promulgation of rules—physical conditions, public benefit, area of the state involved,
relation between intensity of pollution and public health and damage to property; vari-
ance—Commission to determine that the discharges do not constitute a danger to public
health or safety, and compliance would produce serious hardship without sufficient
public benefit); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 77.260(1) (1963) (Control District Act; variance
—Board to determine if requirement of compliance would result in an arbitrary and un-
reasonable taking of property or in the practical closing of a business without a sufficient
public benefit); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:2204(A) (5) (ii), ;2211 (1965) (enforcement—
character and degree of injury to health and property, the social and economic value of
the source, priority of location in the area, the practicability of reducing the emissions;
variance—Commission to determine if requiring compliance will result in an arbitrary
and unreasonable taking of property or in the practical closing of a business without
sufficient public benefit); Md. Ann. Code art. 43, § 697(c) (Supp. 1967) (promulgation
of rules—nature of area affected, zoning, nature and source of pollution, the problems
of business that may be affected by the rule, environmental conditions, and population
and topography) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 14.58(19), (20), (21) (Supp. 1965) (variance—
Commission to determine if requiring compliance would he inequitable or create undue
hardship, or the hardship would be out of .proportion to the benefit); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 203.110 (Supp. 1967) (variance—Commission to determine if requiring compliance will
result in an arbitrary and unreasonable taking of property or in the closing of a business
without sufficient public benefit and without creating a continuing health hazard) ; Mont.
Rev. Codes Ann. § 69-3916(1) (Supp. 1967) (variance—Board to determine that emis-
sions do not constitute a danger to public health or safety, and compliance would
produce hardship without equal public benefit) ; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 445.525 (1967)
(promulgation of rules—character and degree of injury to health, property or conduct
of business, social and economic value of the source, practicability and reasonableness of
reducing or eliminating contaminants, location of the source, population density at the
source, atmospheric conditions at the source, relation of emissions to conditions in the
area, the cost of control equipment and efforts previously made to reduce emissions); H.
Bill 352, § 1-125:83, 1967 N.H. Laws (variance—progress of polluter in eliminating
pollution, character and degree of injury to health and property, the social and economic
value of source; ultimate determination whether enforcement would produce serious
economic hardship without equal public benefit) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-14-5(B)(1),
-8, -11(E) (Supp. 1967) (promulgation of rules—character and degree of injury to health,
welfare and property, the public interest, including social and economic value of source,
practicability of reducing contaminants with control equipment; enforcement—injury to
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human, plant, and animal life or property, interference with the use of property, practi-
cability of compliance; variance—Board to determine that requiring compliance will re-
sult in an arbitrary and unreasonable taking of property or will impose an undue burden
on business and granting variance will not result in injury to health or safety) ; N.Y.
Pub. Health Law § 1282(3) (McKinney Supp. 1967) (enforcement—in fashioning remedy,
Board to determine if compliance would be impossible or impracticable either because no
means is available or because of financial inability to comply); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.2
(Stipp. 1967) (enforcement—feasibility of compliance with standard) ; H. Bill 689,
§§ 1-3704.03(E), .03(F), .06, 1967 Ohio Laws (promulgation of rules—conditions that
will result from compliance and the benefit to the public from compliance, quantity and
characteristics of contaminants, topography and prevailing winds; enforcement—physical
and economic feasibility of compliance; variance—Board to determine if compliance is
impractical, compliance is not feasible or unreasonable, and emissions have little effect on
health) ; ch. 80, §§ 2(I)(d), (J)(b),.1967 Okla. Laws (Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 118, 119
(1967)) (enforcement—character and degree of injury to health, welfare and property,
social and economic value of the source, suitability of the source to the locality, priority
of location in the area, practicability and reasonableness of reducing the emissions, the
quantity or characteristics of air contaminants; variance—Council to determine that
requiring compliance will result• in arbitrary and unreasonable .taking of property or
practical closing of a business without sufficient public benefit; Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ . 449.785,
.810 (1965) (promulgation of rules—the quantity, characteristics and duration of air
contaminants in the area, existing physical conditions, including winds, topography, at-
mospheric conditions, and possible chemical reactions, predominant character of develop-
ment of the area, availability and feasibility of air cleaning devices, effect on health,
property and comfort of particular air contaminants, volume of contaminants emitted,
economic and industrial development of the state, others; variance—Authority to deter-
mine if compliance is inappropriate due to conditions beyond the control of the polluter
or because of special circumstances that make compliance burdensome or because compli-
ance will result in curtailment or closing of a business or because no alternative facility is
available) ; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 23-25-5(h), -15 (Supp. 1966) (enforcement—popula-
ation density, air pollution levels, character and degree of injury to health or property,
economic and social necessity of source; variance—Director to determine if requiring
compliance would produce undue hardship without a sufficient public benefit, no person
may obtain a variance if he is creating a danger to public health or safety); S.C. Code
Ann. §§ 70-123.1(A) (4) (ii), -1233 (Supp. 1965) (enforcement—character and degree of
injury to health and property, social and economic value of the source, priority of location
in the area, the practicability and reasonableness of reducing the emissions; variance—.
Authority to determine if requiring compliance will result in an arbitrary and unreasonable
taking of property or in closing and elimination of a business without sufficient public
benefit) ; Tenn. Code Ann. § 53-3413 (Supp. 1967) (promulgation of rules—character and
degree of injury to health, welfare and property, the social and economic value of the
source, the suitability of the source to its location, the practicability and reasonableness
of reducing the emission of contaminants; enforcement—same; variance—same) ; Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4477-5, §§ 4(5) (b), 9 (Supp. 1967) (enforcement—character and
degree of injury to health and property, social and economic value of the source, priority
of location in the area, practicability and reasonableness of reducing the emissions; vari-
ance—Board to determine if requiring compliance will result in an unreasonable and
arbitrary taking of property or the closing and elimination of a business without sufficient
public benefit); Utah Code Ann. § 26-24-5(7) (Supp. 1967) (variance—Council to deter-
mine if requiring compliance will result in an arbitrary and unreasonable taking of
property or closing of a business without sufficient public benefit) ; Va. Code Ann.
§ 10-17.18(e) (Supp. 1966) (promulgation of rules—character and degree of injury to
safety, health and property, social and economic value of the source, suitability of the
activity to its location, the practicability of reducing the discharge; enforcement—same);
ch. 238, § 31, 1967 Wash. Laws (Wash. Leg. Serv. 579-80 (1967)) (variance—Board to
determine that the emission, occurring or proposed, will not endanger public health or
safety and that compliance would produce serious hardship without sufficient public
benefit; Board must weigh relative interests of the applicant, owners of property affected
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discretionary or mandatory on the consideration of certain interests
or on the finding of certain facts.'"
The majority of the statutes which set forth factors to be con-
sidered by the agency in promulgating standards simply list the vari-
ables which help determine the amount of air pollution in a particular
area of the state.'" Because the same amount of air contaminants in
two differents areas of the state may produce varying degrees of air
pollution, the stringency of an emission standard must depend on the
topography, the climate, the direction and velocity of prevailing winds,
the zoning classifications, and other pertinent factors in each area. As
a result, the factors considered by the agency at this stage insure that
the standards are created commensurate with the threat of health or
property damage in an area.
The competing interests in air pollution control are given the
most consideration at the enforcement level. In deciding whether to
issue an order against one who has violated an emission standard or
permit, the agency is instructed by many of the statutes to determine
the reasonableness of the defendant's emissions by considering a
by discharge and the public) ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-494(b), -497 (Supp. 1967) (promul-
gation of rules—the character and degree of injury to health and property of the public
and the flora and fauna of the state, the social and economic value of the source, the
priority of location in the area, the practicability and the reasonableness of reducing the
emissions; variance—Council to determine that the emissions do not endanger or tend to
endanger human health or safety and that compliance would produce serious hardship
without sufficient public benefit).
1131 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1712 (Supp. May 1967) (mandatory) ; Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 82-1939 (Supp. 1967) (permissive) ; Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 24296, 24365.5
(West 1967) (Control District Act and Bay Area Control Act—mandatory) ; ch. 1545,
§ 5-39475, 1967 Cal. Laws (Cal. Leg. Serv. 2783 (1967)) (Mulford-Carrell Air Resources
Act—mandatory) ; H. Bill 1024, § 11, 1966 Colo. Laws (U.S. Dep't of Health, Education
& Welfare, Digest of State Air Pollution Laws 49-50 (1966)) (permissive) ; P.A. 754,
§ 14(a), 1967 Conn. Laws (Conn. Leg. Serv. 1083 (1967)) (permissive) ; ch. 67-436, § 21,
1967 Fla. Laws (Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 940 (1967)) (permissive) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 88-912
(Supp. 1967) (permissive) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 111%, § 240.11 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (per-
missive) ; H. File 480, § 13, 1967 Iowa Acts (Iowa Leg. Serv. 282 (1967)) (permissive) ;
S. Bill 428, § 13(a), 1967 Kan. Laws (mandatory) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 224.410
(Supp. 1967) (Control Act; permissive) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 77.260(1) (1963) (Con-
trol District Act—mandatory) ; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:2211 (1965) (permissive) ; Md.
Ann. Code art. 43, § 698(b) (Supp. 1967) (permissive) ; Mich. Stat. Ann §§ 14.58(19),
(20), (21) (Supp. 1965) (generally permissive, but mandatory on finding that hardship
is out of proportion to benefits) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 203.110(1) (Supp. 1967) (permissive) ;
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 69-3916(1) (Supp. 1967) (permissive) ; Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 445.545(1) (b) (1967) (permissive) ; H. Bill 352, § 1-125:83, 1967 N.H. Laws (permis-
sive) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-14-8(A) (Supp. 1967) (permissive) ; H. Bill 689, § 1-3704.03-
(F), 1967 Ohio Laws (permissive) ; ch. 80, § 2(J) (b), 1967 Okla. Laws (Okla. Sess. Law
Serv. 119 (1967)) (permissive) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 449.810 (1965) (permissive) ; R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. § 23-25-15(a) (Supp. 1966) (permissive) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 70-123.3(a) (1962)
(permissive) ; Tenn. Code Ann. § 53-3415(c) (Supp. 1967) (permissive) ; Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann. art. 4477-5, § 9(A) (Supp. 1967) (permissive) ; Utah Code Ann. § 26-24-5(7)
(Supp. 1967) (permissive) ; ch. 238, § 31(1), 1967 Wash. Laws (Wash. Leg. Serv. .579
(1967)) (permissive) ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-497(a) (Supp. 1967) (permissive).
162 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, I 6203 (b) (Supp. 1966).
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number of factors. Although the number and exact wording of the
factors may differ from state to state,' most of the statutes borrow
heavily from nuisance law. As a result, the four factors considered
in nuisance law—(1) the type of injury or interference with safety,
health, or use of property which is caused or threatened; (2) the social
and economic value of the activity involved; (3) the suitability of the
activity to its location; and (4) the scientific and economic practi-
cability of reducing or elminating the discharge resulting from the
activity—are representative of those used in the statutes and may be
used for purposes of analysis.'" The first factor—the type of injury or
interference caused or threatened—is a complex one. In assessing this
factor, the agency should consider the character and extent of the harm
involved. The character of the harm may be damage to land, crops,
livestock, or buildings, injury to health, or simply personal discomfort
or annoyance. Since the emission of air contaminants may have varied
effects on individuals, ranging from slight inconvenience to major
respiratory diseases,'" the degree of interference should be considered
in determining the extent of the harm. Because the extent of the harm
increases as the interference grows in duration, the agency should also
ascertain whether the emissions occur periodically or continually.
Although this factor is, on its face, identical to that used in
nuisance law,'" it is important to recognize one difference. In nuisance
law, the gravity of the harm is looked at in terms of the normal man
with ordinary sensibilities,' whereas, in most states, the model of
comparison in promulgating and enforcing an air pollution standard is
the most susceptible man in the community. 1" Consequently, an emis-
sion source using the most modern air pollution control devices and,
therefore, emitting only a small quantity of smoke each day, may be
deemed to be causing grave harm even though the man with normal
sensibilities is not affected by the smoke.
The second factor for the agency to consider in determining the
reasonableness of the defendant's emission—the social and economic
value of the activity involved—pertains to the utility of the defendant's
business. Under this factor the agency should assess the weight of the
public's interest in having the defendant continue to operate his busi-
163 See note 160 supra.
104 See Clinic & Hospital, Inc. v. McConnell, 236 S.W.2d 384, 391 (Mo. Ct. App.
1951) ; Restatement of Torts §§ 827, 828 (1939).
165 See Rheingold, Civil Cause of Action for Lung Damage Due to Pollution of
Urban Atmosphere, 33 Brooklyn L. Rev. 17, 21-24 (1966).
1" See Restatement of Torts § 827 (1939).
167 See Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So. 2d 552, 555 (Fla. 1956) ; Restatement of Torts
§ 827, Comment d.
188 1967 Hearings 1578. See also S. Edelman, The Law of Federal Air Pollution
Control, Paper presented at 59th Annual Meeting of the Air Pollution Control Association
9-10 (1966).
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ness so that it will produce its product and provide employment."°
In assessing this interest, the number of people employed should be
considered in determining the economic value of the activity, and the
benefit that society derives from the type of product that is being
produced should be considered in determining the activity's social
value. The agency, however, must be careful not to overemphasize the
economic and social value of the activity involved in determining the
reasonableness of defendant's emissions because those industries which
are often accused of causing or contributing the most to air pollution
are those which employ millions, produce necessary products, and
contribute greatly to the economic well being of our country.'"
The suitablity of the defendant's activity to its location is the
third factor listed for the agency's consideration. The suitability of a
particular activity to a locality is dependent on its compatability with
the predominant activities in that locality.'" Zoning ordinances can
play a large role in an agency's determination of this question. This
factor has been included in nuisance law because the courts have
realized that public policy demands people to carry on business in
suitable places so as to avoid as much conflict as possible between in-
compatible interests. Also the courts recognize that the activity can
often be conducted elsewhere with less harm resulting to the individuals
who live nearby. 172
Air pollution, however, does not lend itself to such a simplistic
remedy. It is true that individuals who live near an emission source
would be affected by air pollution to a lesser extent if all emission
sources were located in one industrial area far away from their homes.
But by placing all emission sources in one location, severe harm would
most likely be caused to the many individuals who work in that partic-
ular location.'" Suitability of the activity to its location may be of
small consequence to the ultimate harm caused to the public, inasmuch
as air contaminants may cause harm far from their source.' More-
over, the general air mass over an urban area will, for the most part,
remain the same regardless of where the emission sources are located. 175
188 Cf. Gronn v. Rogers Constr., Inc., 221 Ore. 226, 350 P.2d 1086 (1960) .
178 See U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, The Federal Air Pollution
Program 5 (1966) ; Rheingold, supra note 165, at 19.
171 See Restatement of Torts § 828, Comment f (1939).
172 See id .
173 See L. Herber, Crisis in Our Cities 56-57 (1965).
174 Air contaminants originating in Texas and Oklahoma were identified in Cincin-
nati over 1000 miles away. Forests in the Great Smokies are being damaged by pollutants
emitted from TVA installations in Knoxville and Chattanooga. U.S. Dep't of Health,
Education, and Welfare, Technological Change as It Relates to Air Pollution, in .5
Technology and the American Economy V-136 (1966). See also Gruber, The Role to be
Played by Local and State Government, in National Conference on Air Pollution Pro-
ceedings 322 (U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare 1963).
178 There are of course exceptions such as where the city is located near an ocean
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Because the emission of air contaminants may produce harm to the
public regardless of location of its source, it is extremely difficult to see
what relevance the suitability of the activity to its location has in an
agency's determination of the reasonableness of the defendant's emis-
sion of air contaminants. 176
The final factor for the agency to consider is the scientific and
economic practicability of reducing or eliminating the discharge re-
sulting from the activity. The defendant's conduct would be considered
unreasonable if he fails to take practicable steps to reduce the harm
that his activities cause.' Scientific practicability should be contingent
on the "state of the art," 78 and economic practicability should exist
where one can substantially reduce the harm without abandoning his
activity or incurring expense or hardship of a magnitude which would
make it considerably less profitable to continue. According to the
Restatement of Torts,' the test of practicability in nuisance law is
whether the defendant could effectively and profitably achieve his
main objective in such a way that the harm to others would be sub-
stantially reduced or eliminated. If he could, then the failure to avoid
the harm deprived his conduct of reasonableness it might otherwise
have, and the interference is deemed unreasonable as a matter of law.
The consideration of this fourth factor by the agency takes into
account the main interests involved in air pollution control. The
public's interest in clean air is considered, for industry must do all
that is scientifically and economically practicable to reduce its emissions
and comply with the standard. At the same time the interest of in-
dustry in operating, and the public's interest in the continuous opera-
tion of the plant are also considered because the industry will most likely
not be forced to cease operating in order to comply with the standard. 18°
Although the statutes do not state how the factors listed are to be
balanced by the agency in determining the reasonableness of the defend-
ant's emissions, the nature of the factors gives some evidence of the
and the winds carry the air contaminants over the ocean. The location of the emission
source could be important in a rural community where only one mill is located, but
location of the source in New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago or other large urban areas
may not have a great effect on the overall general air mass.
176 Some states omit this factor from those that the agency must consider. See, e.g.,
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 35-4604(A) (2) (Supp. 1967).
177 See Restatement of Torts § 828, Comment g (1939).
178 See Hearings on S. 780 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., let Sess., pt. 4, at 2384-85 (1967).
170 See Restatement of Torts §'828, Comment g (1939).
HO In People v. Peterson, 31 Misc. 2d 738, 226 N,Y.S.2d 1004 (Erie County Ct.
1961), People v. Savage, 1 Misc. 2d 337, 148 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1955), and People v.
Osvald, 1 Misc. 2d 726, 116 N.Y.S.2d 50 (N.Y. City Magis. Ct. 1952), the New York
courts held that where the defendant has done everything possible at the time of the
alleged violation of an air pollution standard in order to comply with it, he will not be
found guilty of the offense charged.
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weight to be given each. The first factor the agency should consider is
the scientific practicability and economic reasonableness of reducing the
emissions. Because the primary goal of air pollution control is to
achieve clean air, no emission source, regardless of its social and
economic value, which may injure or interfere with the health or
physical property of individuals should be considered reasonable un-
less everything practicable is done to reduce or eliminate the emissions.
If the agency finds that the defendant is doing all that is possible,
within the limits of technical and economic practicability, to reduce
his air contaminant emissions, it should then weigh the gravity of the
harm to the public against the economic and social value of the emis-
sion source. The defendant's emission of air contaminants should be
considered unreasonable by the agency, unless the utility of the de-
fendant's activity outweighs the gravity of the harm that is caused or
threatened. Only by employing this test in the enforcement of an air
pollution standard can the agency strike a proper balance.
The conflicting interests may also be considered by the administra-
tive agency at the enforcement level through a proceeding to determine
whether to grant a variance. A variance is a statement by the ad-
ministrative agency that it will not attempt to enforce a standard
against an individual and that the individual will be allowed to dis-
charge air contaminants for a longer period of time or to a greater
extent than provided in the standard."' The right to emit air con-
taminants under a variance is not usually unlimited, however. The
variance will of ten require the individual to comply with a standard
that is less rigid than the one contained in the applicable regulation or
statute.182
A variance proceeding, like a proceeding to enforce a standard,
involves consideration of conflicting interests. As a result, most of
the statutes183 do not provide both for issuance or variances and con-
sideration of conflicting interests in the enforcement proceeding. There
are, however, three essential differences between these two proceedings.
First, the sole purpose of a variance proceeding is to grant or deny a
variance from a standard. Thus, the variance proceeding is unlike an
enforcement proceeding, since it is not directed at determining whether
an individual has violated a standard nor at determining what sanctions
should be imposed if a violation is found."'" Second, and most im-
portant, the vast majority of statutes which contain variance provisions
181 See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 24291 (West 1967).
182 See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:2211(B) (1965) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 203.110(3)
(Supp. 1967).
183 Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, New Mexico, Ohio,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee and Texas are the only states which have these
considerations at both types of proceedings. See note 159 supra.
184 See p. 726 supra.
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do not require the agency to grant a variance even after it balances the
conflicting considerations in a manner favorable to the individual. In
an enforcement proceeding, the agency is required to act in accordance
with the weight of the various considerations. 185
 In a variance pro-
ceeding, the agency may be required to find certain facts before it can
grant the variance, but the decision to grant the variance is generally
discretionary. 180 Third, a determination of whether to grant a variance
is generally made upon application by the individual,"` whereas a
determination of whether to impose a sanction is initiated by the
agency.
A determination of whether to grant a variance could include
consideration of the four factors which are used in determining
whether to enforce a standard, in order to strike a complete balance of
all interests. Likewise, a variance could be granted as a matter of
right when the administrative agency balances all interests and finds
that the public's interest in clean air is outweighed by the need to
continue the activity which results in the emission of air contaminants.
Existing statutes, however, do not use the variance proceeding in this
way. Variances are not granted as a matter of right. In addition, the
ultimate questions to be answered by the agencies, in determining
whether to grant a variance, give more weight to the public's interest in
clean air than do the four factors considered in deciding whether to
impose a sanction.
The variance provisions in the statutes generally fall into two
categories, with no statute containing both provisions. Those pro-
visions in the first category instruct the agency to consider whether
compliance with the standard will result in an arbitrary and unreason-
able taking of property or in the practical closing and elimination of
any business, occupation or activity, in either case without sufficient
corresponding benefit or advantage to the public. 188 The great weight
accorded to the public's interest in clean air is manifest by the require-
ment that no variance will be allowed unless compliance with a standard
will virtually close a business or result in arbitrary and unreasonable
taking of property. The factors considered at an enforcement proceed-
ing are aimed at determining whether the emission of air contaminants
was reasonable. Under this provision, however, the agency could not
185 See, e.g., P.A. 754, § 5, 1967 Conn. Laws (Conn. Leg. Serv. 1080-81 (1967)) ;
111. Ann. Stat. ch. 111%, § 240.5-1.4 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
184 Of the statutes that provide for variance proceedings, 25 are permissive, whereas
only six are mandatory. See note 161 supra.
187 See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:2211(D) (1.965) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 203.110(4)
(Sapp. 1967).
188 Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky (Control District Act), Louisi-
ana, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas and Utah have similar or identical
provisions. See note 160 supra.
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issue a variance merely because it finds the emissions to be reasonable.
It must find them to be so necessary to the continuation of the activity
that produces the emissions that compliance with the standard will
result in discontinuance of that activity. In addition, it must find that,
on balance, the public benefit to be derived from requiring compliance
with the standard will not outweigh the hardship that compliance would
produce. The exact meaning of this second requirement is somewhat
unclear, since the term "public benefit" is so broad. The "public
benefit" to be considered could be the benefits that result from a re-
duction in air contaminants.'" Another interpretation is that the
"public benefit" is determined by weighing the benefit accruing from
reduction of air contaminants against the public burden accruing from
any loss of employment and loss of a product that might result from
requiring compliance. This latter interpretation seems superior since,
as the statutory inclusion of a balancing process demonstrates, the
policy of the statutes is not to make reduction of contaminants an
absolute where such reduction will result in other public burdens.
The provisions in the second category instruct the agency to con-
sider whether the emissions occurring or proposed to occur endanger
or tend to endanger public health or safety, and whether compliance
with the standard would produce practical difficulty or hardship."'
Such a provision does not involve any balancing of interests since the
effect of the emission on health and safety will always be a controlling
consideration. A variance will never be permitted if the emissions tend
to endanger public health or safety, regardless of the public and
private interest in continued operation of a business. It should be noted
that if the emissions tend solely to endanger property, this provision
would appear to allow a variance since there is no mention of the
danger to property."' Practically speaking, however, it is unlikely that
a danger to property would result without a danger to public health or
safety.
If the emissions do not tend to endanger public health or safety,
it appears that a variance may be granted quite readily, since the
agency need only find that compliance with the standard would result
in "practical difficulty or hardship." The meaning of "practical dif-
ficulty or hardship" is not defined in the statute, but is to be determined
189 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1712 (Supp. May 1967) and Cal. Health & Safety
Code § 24296 (West 1967) which add the words "in the reduction of air contaminants" to
adopt this meaning.
190 Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky (Control Act), Michigan, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington and Wyoming have similar or
identical provisions. The remaining states that have variance proceedings (Arkansas, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Oregon and Tennessee) all emphasize harshness to the individual, but do not
require that the emissions have no bad effects on human health. See note 160 supra.
191 But see H. File 480, § 13(1)(a), 1967 Iowa Acts (Iowa Leg. Serv. 282 (1967)).
754
All? POLLUTION LEGISLATION
in each individual case by the administrative agency. 192 It is clear,
however, that an agency will most often find "practical difficulty or
hardship" rather than require the "virtual closing of a business."
If the sole objective of air pollution control is to eliminate all the
harmful effects of the emission of air contaminants, then the second
type of variance provision is preferable to the first since it places ex-
clusive priority on the need for clean air. It is submitted, however, that
the objective of air pollution control is to reduce the adverse effects
of the emission of air contaminants while at the same time maintain-
ing a proper balance among the competing interests. Thus, the first
type of variance provision would be preferable since it does provide
for some balancing of interests.
Likewise, it would appear that if the goal of air pollution, control
is to maintain a proper balance among all conflicting interests while
reducing the advetse effects of air pollution, this goal can be better
accomplished by a proceeding to enforce a standard than by a vari-
ance proceeding. This conclusion is the result of two factorS: the fact
that variances are not granted. as a matter of right; and the fact that,
even with the preferable first type of variance provision, not alI the
conflicting interests are weighed in a variance proceeding.
IV. CONCLUSION
• In recent years, the amount of air pollution has increased and
the health effects of air pollution have become more evident. Since
the common Iaw and statutory nuisance actions are inadequate to
control air pollution, and because federal policy has been directed at
encouraging state and local control, there has been a recent prolifera-
tion of state air pollution control statutes.
Air pollution control is generally accomplished through the pro-
mulgation of emission standards. Because of the paucity of scientific
data and a desire for flexible enforcement, these standards have often
been so vague or arbitrary that their enforcement results in a denial
of due process of law. In recent years, however, methods have been
developed to quantitize the relation between air contaminants and
their effects on health. The Ringelmann Smoke Chart has come into
widespread use. Federal and state governments have created air
quality criteria and emission standards for some gases. As this in-
formation becomes available and control standards are promulgated
based on this information,- the constitutional problems will disappear:
At the present, the constitutional problems do not appear to impair
effective air pollution control.
There is, however, a crucial problem remaining in air pollution
too. See L. & M. Inv. Co. v. Cutler, 125 Ohio St. 12, 21, 180 N.E. 379, 383 (1932).
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control. Although there is no doubt of the desirability of clean air,
there is also no doubt that the major sources of air pollution are
industries of great social and economic value. In order completely to
attain clean .air, many of these industries would be forced to close.
Therefore, there must be a balance struck between the reduction of
air pollution and the allowance of industry to continue operation if
the United States is to maintain its industrial-based economy. After
the extremely tragic occurrence which took the lives of 17 resi-
dents in 1948, the town of Donora, Pennsylvania, decided that it was
necessary to control air pollution. The measures which were adopted
were effective in virtually eliminating all air pollution in Donora. As
a result, however, the industry on which the town depended was forced
to discontinue operation. Donora is now a ghost-town.193
Consequently, to the extent that the constitutional requirements
must be met and the competing interests must be considered, the
effectiveness of air pollution control will be somewhat diminished.
Whether the "prohibitory" or "permit system" is utilized, the degree
to which the effectiveness is diminished will be the same. The effective-
ness of the "prohibitory system" is further weakened by the fact that
it can only begin to operate after an individual has already emitted
air contaminants. In addition, many individuals will continue to pol-
lute the air because their emissions have not been detected by the
enforcement agency. It is submitted that these two latter disadvan-
tages of the "prohibitory system" might be corrected by the "permit
system." The "permit system" is the preferable approach since its
effect is to prevent air pollution before it occurs, in contrast to the
"prohibitory system's" approach of seeking compliance with a stan-
dard after violation of that standard has already taken placel" and
some harm has already been caused. The "permit system" also has
the advantage of requiring compliance from all possible polluters,
rather than the "hit or miss" type of enforcement under the "prohibi-
tory system," where actual violation must be observed and violaters
may go undetected.
RICHARD A. ADORN
CARL E. AXELROD
193
 Statement by Dr. Melvin First before the Mass. Special Joint Leg. Comm. on
Air Pollution, Aug 24, 1967.
194 See Kennedy, The Mechanics of Legislative and Regulatory Action, in National
Conference on Air Pollution Proceedings 306, 311 (1962).
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